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642 631 And on 14 November a law was passed providing for the election by local assemblies of a *Landeshauptmann* or Governor and subordinates, who were to take over all the business formerly transacted by the State officials and the Statthalter, appointed by the Emperor.[1] This meant, in effect, the abolition of the dual system, and a large measure of decentralization in administrative matters.[2]

The position as regards the relationship between the State and the Provinces throughout the first two years of the Republic was, therefore, somewhat obscure; and this state of affairs not unnaturally resulted in the strengthening of separatist feeling. Traces of this may be seen in the provisions drawn up regarding provincial legislation on 14 March 1919.[3] It was then laid down that laws passed by Provincial Assemblies required counter-signature by a Secretary of State or the Chancellor. But even if assent was refused the Provincial Assembly could, if it wished, then reintroduce and pass the bill. If, however, provincial legislation required the co-operation of the State for its implementation, the Government, acting as a whole, could refuse assent. The Government thus had a suspensive, but not an absolute veto over provincial legislation.

631 665 The different opinions which, as has been pointed out, prevailed in Vienna, where the Social Democrats were in power, and the Provinces, which were for the most part Christian Socialist strongholds, came to the fore strongly at the various conferences held regarding the form of the final constitution.[4]

The main demand of the Christian Socialist party, after the withdrawal of the Emperor, was that German Austria must be a federal State, in which the member States would have relatively far-reaching rights of self-government.[5] The reasons adduced by the party in support of its federalist programme

[1] St. G. Bl. Nr. 24.

[2] Eisenmann, *La Constitution Fédérale de la République d'Autriche* (Paris, 1924), pp. 37–8.

[3] St. G. Bl. Nr. 179. [4] See Appendix A.

[5] The views of the more extreme federalists, such as Dr. Ender, amounted in fact to a claim that Austria should become a federation of independent States.

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were various. Many of them were characterized by an appeal to the medieval past, when, it was asserted, each Province had had a virtually autonomous status.[1] The only link between them had been superimposed in course of time by the Habsburgs. When the Habsburg superstructure disappeared they reverted to their former position of independence.[2]

It was obvious, however, that the federalist policy of the Christian Socialists was inspired for the most part by more practical reasons. The party as a whole was animated by intense dislike of 'Red' Vienna, and feared that a disproportionate amount of power would fall to her, as the capital city, if a unitary State were established.

This antagonism, already in existence before the war, was sharpened by the events following on the Armistice. It was felt, for instance, that the Social Democrats, who were then in control of the Government, had made no attempt to protect the Provinces against the attacks of marauding bands of soldiers, although Vienna had had both the arms and the men necessary.[3] The secrecy of Viennese foreign policy was also mistrusted, for it was widely believed that everything was being sacrificed to the policy of *Anschluss*, a policy which the Christian Socialists regarded with increasing misgiving after the Spartacist rising of 1918 in Germany, and the subsequent Communist disturbances.[4] The economic policy of Vienna was also much disliked, and the socialization projects were strenuously resisted. Opposition in the Provinces to the requisitioning system, which had to be continued even after the Armistice, amounted at times to economic blockade.

[1] Speech by Dr. Ender at the Salzburg Provincial Conference, February 1920, *Stenographische Verhandlungschrift*, p. 28, 'Bevor Österreich-Ungarn bestanden hat, hat Tyrol bestanden, u. wird weiter bestehen'. Also, Seipel, 'Die Absonderung der Länder', *Politische Gesellschaft*, 14 May 1919, and Seipel, *Der Kampf um die österreichische Verfassung* (Wien, 1930), pp. 74–6.

[2] It was pointed out that the Provisional National Assembly had virtually recognized this fact by inviting the Provinces, on 29 October 1918, to announce their accession to the new State of German Austria. (Speech by Ehrer at the Salzburg Provincial Conference, op. cit., p. 20.)

[3] Seipel, 'Die Absonderung der Länder', *Politische Gesellschaft*, 14 May 1919, pp. 74–6.

[4] In the Draft Constitution of 12 November 1918, which was passed as a temporary measure by the National Assembly, it was stated that "German Austria is a part of the German Republic". (St. G. Bl. Nr. 5, Article 2.)

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631 665 There were, however, men in the Christian Socialist party, as, for instance, the Prälat Hauser, who saw clearly the danger of allowing particularism in the Provinces to assume too great proportions, and who realized that the future well-being of the Austrian Republic must depend upon the breaking-down of existing barriers between the peasants and the workers. But, although the federalist policy of the Christian Socialists was probably to a large extent dictated by opportunist reasons, there was a certain positive substratum beneath these. As Herr Steidle remarked at the Salzburg Provincial Conference, federalism was a form of government particularly well adapted to the German mentality, with its love for complex organizations.[1]

The Christian Socialist party devoted much attention to the composition of the Upper or Federal Chamber. The more extreme federalists were of the opinion that each member State should have equal representation, on the Swiss model, irrespective of the size of its territory or the numbers of its population, on the ground that all the Provinces were equal and independent member States of the Federation. More moderate federalists were, however, prepared to envisage some kind of differential representation, which would take such differences into account.[2] In this case also, the views of the Christian Socialists were coloured by the knowledge that their position in the small Provinces like Tyrol and Vorarlberg was

[1] 'Die deutsche Nationaleigentümlichkeit war immer auf den Foderalismus aufgebaut. Das war seit undenklichen Zeiten so, das liegt den Deutchen im Blut.' (Steidle, Salzburg Provincial Conference, op. cit., p. 48.) Cf. Seipel, *Nation u. Staat* (Wien, 1916), and Mayr, '100 Sitzung der konstituierenden National Versammlung der Republik Österreich', *Stenographisches Protokoll*, p. 3383.

[2] The populations of the nine Provinces were as follows:

Province	Area (sq. miles)	Population
Vienna	107	1,863,783
Lower Austria	7,462	1,478,697
Upper Austria	4,628	873,702
Salzburg	2,763	222,731
Styria	6,327	977,350
Carinthia	3,684	370,432
Tyrol	4,790	313,699
Vorarlberg	1,005	139,968
Burgenland	1,586	286,299

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a very strong one, whereas it was very much less strong in the large, semi-industrial Provinces, as Upper and Lower Austria.

As regards the position of the future President of the Republic, the Christian Socialists were of the opinion that he should be directly elected. This, they hoped, would enable him to adopt a more independent position *vis-à-vis* a possible Social Democrat majority in the Lower House. This proposal was, however, strongly contested by the Social Democrats, who feared that it would be the thin end of the wedge of authoritarian government.

The Christian Socialists wished provision to be made for the direct participation of the people in the business of government, through the Referendum and the Initiative.[1]

But, if it can be said of the Christian Socialists that their views on the new constitution were occasioned for the most part by the political exigencies of the moment rather than by abstract views on the best form of government, the same can certainly be said of the Social Democrats. Their opposition to federalism, for instance, was undoubtedly largely occasioned by fear of reactionary tendencies in the Provinces. They maintained that Christian Socialist contentions regarding the historic individuality of the Provinces were illusory. Most of the Provinces, they argued, had simply grown out of the inheritances of the great feudal families, and were often quite unsuitable as economic units.[2] In any case, many of them had had their boundaries so altered in the course of the war as to make ridiculous any attempt to identify them with pre-war units. The districts which remained were often so situated as to make them quite unsuitable for maintenance even as units of common administration.[3] In any case most of the so-called rights of self-government enjoyed by the Provinces had only

[1] It is interesting to find that Seipel was a particularly strong supporter of these devices. He specially approved, for instance, of the provision that minorities in three different Provinces should be enabled to join together, if by so doing they could amass the requisite 300,000 votes for an Initiative. ('Verfassungsreform u. Wirtschaftsleben', *Reichspost*, 15 February 1920. Also, Seipel, *Der Kampf um die österreichische Verfassung*, pp. 77–9.)

[2] Resel, Salzburg Provincial Conference, op. cit., p. 22.

[3] Speech by Gruener, Salzburg Provincial Conference, op. cit., p. 16; cf. Grogger, op. cit., p. 27.

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631 665 been acquired in the course of the last few months. There was now no reason for encouraging federalist sentiment since the nationality problem no longer existed and the duplication of administrative machinery would entail expenditure on a scale which the new Republic could ill afford.[1] Moreover, the National Assembly was itself only a *Landtag* of the German Reich.[2]

The Social Democrats were, however, sufficiently realist in their politics to admit that the federal principle would have to be to some extent incorporated in the new State organization. They therefore concentrated upon the mitigation of what they considered its most obvious dangers.[3]

They were strongly in favour of the introduction of the unicameral system for the legislature. In their view, if the Upper House had no power as against the Lower House, it was merely a piece of unnecessary machinery. If the Upper House had such power, and was indirectly elected, the democratic body would be made responsible to an only indirectly democratic body. If, on the other hand, the Upper House were directly elected, it would in all probability be merely a replica of the Lower House.[4] However, the party as a whole realized that the introduction of the unicameral system was not practical politics. They therefore concentrated on an attempt to eliminate, as far as possible, the federal character of the Upper House. It must be elected, they maintained, on a population basis, as it would obviously be

[1] Dolser, Salzburg Provincial Conference, op. cit., p. 50; cf. Preussler, 4th Sitzung, 14 March 1919.

[2] The Social Democrats feared that the development of a federal system would make the conclusion of an *Anschluss* with Germany more difficult, since Germany would not be prepared to recognize this arrangement.

[3] Herr Danneberg, for instance, in the debate on the final proposals laid before the Constituent National Assembly, urged that, since a federal constitution was to be adopted, the existing boundaries of the Provinces should not be considered as in any way sacrosanct, and that, in order to safeguard the democratic principle, it should be provided that, if a part of a Province having a population equal to or greater than that of Vorarlberg, wished to join another Province, or form an independent Province, they should, as provided in the new German Constitution, be permitted to do so. (100 Sitzung, Constituent National Assembly, p. 3386.)

[4] Speech by Grüber, Salzburg Provincial Conference, op. cit., p. 65.

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undemocratic to give equal representation to Provinces whose population figures were so unequal. The party also aimed at curtailing its power as far as possible.

The Social Democrats disliked the Christian Socialist project of a President directly elected by the people. They thought it better that the functions of a President should be discharged by the President of the National Council. Direct election of a President would, they feared, inevitably introduce an autocratic element into the Government.[1]

They were somewhat lukewarm in their support of direct legislation by the people through the Initiative and the Referendum, as these devices would tend, they thought, to undermine the omnipotence of the National Assembly. A dangerous element of procrastination would be introduced into the business of government and misunderstandings would inevitably occur as it was almost always impossible to answer 'yes' or 'no' to complicated legislative projects. It would be much better to let the people exercise their control by shortening the legislative period.[2]

The Social Democrats were emphatically of the opinion that the democratization of government and administration in the Provinces was the *sine qua non* of democratic progress, particularly if a federal system was to be introduced.[3]

The views of the German Nationalists need not be considered in detail, for they did not materially influence the drafting of the constitution. It may be noted, however, that they, like the Christian Socialists, showed a tendency to distrust the autocracy of the Lower House. For this reason, they were anxious to secure direct election for the President.[4] And they were prepared to envisage an even wider use of the Initiative and

[1] Speech by Danneberg, Stenographische Verhandlungschrift über die Länderkonferenz in Linz, 1920, pp. 22–3; and 100 Sitzung, Constituent National Assembly, p. 3390. It is interesting to note that Kelsen, one of the authors of the 1920 Constitution, was also strongly of the opinion that the direct election of the President would mean, in reality, a weakening rather than a strengthening of the democratic principle. (*Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts*, 1920, vol. ix, op. cit., p. 281.)

[2] Danneberg, 100 Sitzung, Constituent National Assembly, p. 3396.

[3] Grüber, Linz Provincial Conference, op. cit., p. 9.

[4] 100 Sitzung, Constituent National Assembly, p. 3400.

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631 665 the Referendum than were most of the Christian Socialists.[1] Some of the Social Democrats were anxious for the establishment of an Economic Chamber which would have at least large advisory powers, side by side with the National Council and the Federal Council. In this Chamber, employers and employees should be equally represented.[2] The Social Democrats, however, wanted above all things, union with Germany.

[1] Langoth, *Stenographische Verhandlungschrift über die Länderkonferenz* in Linz Provincial Conference, April 1920, p. 11.
[2] Ibid., p. 12.

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ties were due. The reformers of 1929 mistook effects for causes.

It was, for instance, widely felt that one of the great evils in the post-war Austrian state had been the politicizing of every department of public life.[1] This was certainly true. But it was not realized that the cause of this lay to a great extent in the constitution itself. The Government had been deliberately placed under the control of the National Council; and instead of being regarded as the executive committee of that body, it had come to be considered as a weak, but potentially dangerous, rival, whose powers must be curtailed at all costs.

The National Council possessed all the necessary constitutional means to enforce its authority. But it was itself controlled by the party leaders as, owing to the system of proportional representation and the closed list, these had almost absolute control over its members. Thus the proper organs of control—the electorate, the National Council, and the Government—had been in the hands of an irresponsible group of men, many of whom were possibly not even known to the Austrian public.[2] For twelve years the party system had thus run riot in Austria, and in consequence many people had come to believe that it was a system inherently vicious, and to advocate its supersession, and the substitution of some non-party form of organization in its stead. But in fact, different parties are simply the organized expression of differences of opinion among the electorate, and as such they are a necessary concomitant of any democratic government. Their abolition may temporarily hide such differences, but can hardly eradicate them. And, if differences cannot be voiced constitutionally, they may

[1] 'Tatsächlich ergab sich auf Grund dieser Verfassung im Verlauf der vergangenen zehn Jahre eine Ueberpolitisierung unseres gesamten Lebens, eine Diktatur des Parteiwesens, dessen Einfluss weit über den politischen Bereich hinaus greift u. so ziemlich alle Gebiete des wirtschaftlichen wie des geistigen Lebens erfasst hat. (*Neues Wiener Tageblatt*, 22 September 1929.)

[2] The disadvantages of the closed-list system were, however, beginning to be understood, and the need for a closer connection between electors and elected urged. 'Tatsächlich wurden die Volksvertreter in ihrer Überzahl nichtmehr vom Volke gewählt, sondern von den Parteiführer, den Parteisekretariaten nominiert.' (*Neues Wiener Tageblatt*, 21 September 1929.) For the same reason large electoral districts were now deprecated. In the end, however, the electoral system remained unchanged.

well find a more dangerous outlet. The parties were not the villains of the piece—but the constitution, by which they were accorded a disproportionate amount of power.

Distrust of the National Council was manifested on all sides. The parties of the right hoped to undermine its power by strengthening the office of President; the Social Democrats, by a more frequent use of the Referendum.[1] In fact, it transpired in the course of the 1929 debates on constitutional reform, that the Social Democrats had revised their views on constitutional questions almost as much as their rivals, the Christian Socialists. Renner, for instance, in the debate on the first reading, remarked that the great weakness of the 1920 constitution had been the concentration of power in the Lower House, to the exclusion of all other bodies.[2] For this reason he announced his approval of the proposals made for strengthening the position of the Government and the President.[3] It is true that Renner was very much more conservative in his views than the majority of the Social Democrats. But the party leaders as a whole were well aware that they were on the defensive, and they did not therefore show themselves averse from reasonable compromise.

One result of the over-politicizing of public life, to which attention had frequently been drawn in the past by Dr. Zimmermann, had been a tendency to multiply officials, and thus to increase the cost of government.[4] Attempts to check

[1] Their proposal was that every bill taken up by Parliament should be submitted to a Referendum if one-third of the National Council advised it, or if 300,000 electors demanded it. (See *Pester Lloyd*, 10 October 1930.)

[2] 'Das ist die erste grosse u. tragische Schwäche unserer geltenden Verfassung, dass sie nicht ein Gleichgewicht hergestellt hat unter den mehreren Trägern der staatlichen Autorität, sondern dass sie alles auf eine Karte gesetzt hat, dass sie den Staat u. seine Ordnung, seine Sicherheit u. Freiheit auf die eine Säule des allmächtigen Parlaments aufbauen wollte. . . . Die Verfassungsnovelle ist vor allem charakterisiert durch das Bemühen, das alte demokratische Ideal der Gewalttrennung durchzuführen.' (*Stenographisches Protokoll*, 102 Sitzung, 22 October 1929.)

[3] 'Es soll vor allem die Bundesregierung in ihrer Position gestärkt werden. Das geschieht schon dadurch, dass der Bundespräsident sie ernennt. Der vorliegende Entwurf hält die Mitte zwischen der Präsidenten-Republik u. der Parlamentarischen-Republik; ich glaube eine gesunde u. richtige Mitte' (op. cit.).

[4] *Neues Wiener Abendblatt*, 18 September 1929. Schober pointed out that Austria, a country of seven million persons, had seven hundred members of legislative bodies, (*Reichspost*, 20 October 1929.)

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V

THE INFLUENCE OF THE PARTY SYSTEM ON THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

PARLIAMENTARY democracy, as a form of government, can only be successful when the parties are more or less at one in their fundamental aims, and are ready to compromise as to the methods best calculated to attain them. An attempt should therefore be made to estimate how far divergences in the political theories of the various parties in the State contributed towards bringing about the breakdown.

It is undeniable that there was an absolute divergence between the political theories of the more extreme exponents of Austro-Marxism and that of the right-wing Christian Socialists, and that no satisfactory compromise between the two creeds would have been possible.

The aim of the Austro-Marxists from 1919 on was the supersession of the capitalist-bourgeois State by a socialist proletarian one.[1] Most of the leaders, however, believed that this aim could only be achieved if Austria were joined on to Germany, because 'independence' meant that the Allies could starve her out if they disapproved of her policy; the realization of the *Anschluss* was, therefore, the first point of their programme. It is true that hatred of the Bolsheviks was always a marked characteristic of the Austrian Social Democrats. But this animosity was occasioned rather by a dislike of Bolshevik methods than by disapproval of Bolshevik aims.[2] And it was

[1] Bauer, 'Die alte u. die neue Linke', *Kampf*, July 1920: 'Die Eroberung der Demokratie stellte uns daher vor die Frage, in welche Weise u. mit welchen Mitteln wir auf dem neu eroberten Terrain den Kampf um den Sozialismus zu führen haben.' See also the Linz Programme of the Social Democratic Party, 1926. One of the points incorporated in this programme was: '. . . die überwindung der kapitalistischen, der Aufbau der sozialistischen Gesellschaftsordnung'.

[2] '. . . nicht der Kommunismus das trennende Moment, sondern der Bolshevismus, nicht also die prinzipielle Grundlage, sondern bloss die Taktik.' (Max Adler, 'Sozialismus u. Kommunismus,' January 1919, *Kampf*: Cf. *Kampf*, July 1921, article by Max Adler.) '. . . Im Willen zum Sozialismus ist die Arbeiterklasse einig. Nur um den Weg zum Ziele ist Streit.' (*Arbeiter Zeitung*, 15 March 1919.)

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stated, over and over again, unequivocally, by the party leaders, in the party press, and at party conferences from 1919 to 1934, that the aim of the Social Democrats was the establishment of a purely socialist republic, from which bourgeois influence would be entirely eliminated; although it was generally admitted that a policy of conciliation was temporarily necessary. No permanent agreement between the two classes was, however, considered either possible or desirable.[1]

For the right-wing leaders of the Christian Socialists also, parliamentary democracy was regarded as a temporary form of government. Co-operation with the Social Democrats was felt to be a necessary evil in the immediate post-war period. But in time, it was hoped, socialist wings might again be clipped, and a return made to some form of autocratic government.

This essential divergence in aim of the extremist wings was widened by the personal antagonism between the leading exponents of both creeds. Monsignor Seipel, for instance, necessarily always a Catholic first and an Austrian afterwards, thought that the triumph of the Social Democrats would mean the end of Catholicism in Austria. He saw, in Otto Bauer, the foe *par excellence* of his Church. Bauer, on the other hand, argued that Seipel had deliberately chosen to use the Church as a pawn in his political game.[2] He maintained that, if the

[1] *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 5 January 1919: '. . . die politische Revolution ist nur die halbe Revolution. Sie hebt die politische Unterdrückung auf, aber sie lässt die wirtschaftliche Ausbeutung bestehen. . . . Haben wir dazu die Allgewalt des Kaisers gestürzt, um der Allgewalt des Kapitals unterworfen zu bleiben.'

See also Linz Programme (op. cit.), 1926: 'Eine solche Kooperation der Klassen' (as in a parliamentary democracy like Austria) 'kann . . . nur eine vorübergehende Entwicklungsphase in Klassenkampf um die Staatemacht, aber nicht das Ziel dieses Kampfes sein.'

Julius Braunthal, 'Moskau oder Paris?', *Kampf*, October 1920: 'Wer die Koalitionspolitik der Österreichischen Sozialdemokratie unter einem anderen Gesichtspunkt als dem der Abwehr der Konterrevolution betrachtet, hat sie nie begriffen.'

Deutsch, 'Der Geist der Revolution', *Kampf*, 4 October 1919: 'Die Koalition ist solange keine Gefahr solange wir geistig frei bleiben, u. uns nicht auf die schiefe Bahn einer Klassen-harmonie drängen lassen.'

[2] Bauer, *Sozialdemocratie, Religion u. Kirche* (Wien, 1927): 'Der Klericalismus macht die Religion zur Parteisache der Partei der Bourgeoisie, um auf die Religion der Volksmassen, die Herrschaft der Bourgeoisie zu stützen.'

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interests of the Church were to be identified with those of the Christian Socialist party, if it became one of the main planks of the Christian Socialist platform, then the Social Democrats had no option but to fight it. The Church should be removed entirely from the arena of party politics.

It must be stated, however, in fairness to Seipel, that the cry of 'Religion ist Privatsache' was almost certainly only the thin end of the wedge, for the fact that the leaders of the Social Democrats were, for the most part, not only anti-clerical but also anti-Christian can hardly be contested. Most of them thought, however, that religion should not be actively attacked as it had been in the *Aufklärung* period. With the improvement in economic conditions which they anticipated from socialist administration, religion would, in any case, they thought, die a natural death.[1] In this, as in other cases, the Social Democrat leaders hoped to achieve their aims by peaceful, gradual methods. Bauer deprecated even the intellectual violence of the Free Thinkers. But the personal struggle between Bauer and Seipel was so fierce as to preclude the possibility of peaceful development in any direction. Every small issue which arose was turned by them into party capital.

On the Social Democrat side, the ascendancy of the left wing, represented by such men as Bauer, Deutsch, and Adler, was in part a consequence of the fact that they were intellectually very much abler than the more moderate leaders, such as Renner, Ellenbogen, and Leuthner. They were thus able to exert an influence on the policy of the party which was probably out of proportion to the extent of their following among the rank and file of the members.[2] This influence was, however, almost

[1] Speech of Otto Bauer at the Linz Conference, op. cit., 1926. Also, Otto Bauer, *Sozialdemokratie, Religion u. Kirche*: 'Die Religion ist dem wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus nicht, wofür sie der Liberalismus hielt, blosser Pfaffentrug, der durch blosse Aufklärung überwunden werden könne, sondern das Spiegelbild der wirtschaftlichen u. sozialen Lebensbedingungen der Menschen.'

[2] On the other hand, there existed a revolutionary group to the left of these leaders, for the pronouncedly left-wing view of the Social Democrats had prevented the revolutionaries from joining the Communists in any number. The fact that potentially Communist elements found their spiritual home among the Social Democrats explains in part the attacks made from time to time on the 'moderate' policy of the party.

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665 always used to put a brake on the party when questions of practical politics arose.[1] Indeed, one of the most marked features of Austro-Marxism was its theoretical extremism and its practical moderation.

The adoption of this policy in the post-war period was largely due to the influence of Bauer, who considered that the future of Austro-Marxism depended upon the maintenance of the spirit of revolutionary fervour in the party on abstract questions of socialist doctrine, combined with a moderate policy on practical issues. Bauer hoped, by this policy, to retain within the party extreme left-wing elements, which would otherwise have drifted away towards communism, and to keep the end of the socialist society ever in view, while at the same time extending the influence of the party over the peasants and lesser bourgeoisie, by a practical policy of moderation. He saw clearly in the immediate post-war years that a policy of extremism would in practice lead to the intervention of the Allies, and the triumph, as in Hungary, of a counter-revolution. He emphasized over and over again the fact that conditions in Austria were entirely different from those in Russia, where the peasants had been willing, at first, to co-operate with the revolutionaries, because of their desire for land. It was this co-operation alone which had made the Bolshevik revolution feasible. In Austria, however, no co-operation would be forthcoming from the peasants, who had long been firmly established as landholders. Revolution was not, therefore, immediately feasible.

Bauer's policy was not, however, an entirely opportunist one, for he firmly believed that the future of socialism depended as much on the intellectual development of the workers as on their conquest of material power, and for this reason also he was not averse to a policy of gradualness.[2] On the other hand, he came to fear, after the Vienna riots of 1927, that the peaceful

[1] Both in 1927 and in 1934 the left-wing leaders were forced into action against their will, by uncontrollable extremist agitators.

[2] Bauer's speech at the Linz Conference, 1926: '. . . Ihr Sieg nicht nur davon abhängt, dass sie die Macht erobert, sondern auch davon, dass sie in sich selbst jene moralischen u. intellektuellen Qualitäten entwickelt, ohne die der Sozialismus nicht aufgebaut werden kann.'

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development which he honestly desired might be made impossible by the activities of the right-wing extremists. He saw that the nearer the party came to victory by peaceful constitutional means the more the right-wing Christian Socialists would come to rely on force for its suppression.[1] If the Social Democrats, having lost control of the army, did not defend themselves against this threat, they would probably have to submit to forcible liquidation by the fascists. If, on the other hand, they developed an armed force, they would almost certainly be beaten if it came to an open fight with the Christian Socialists, who would have control over the army and the police force, as well as the *Heimwehr* and the other armed bodies of the right. Moreover, Bauer realized that any signs of militancy on the part of the Social Democrats would react unfavourably on their position *vis-à-vis* their more moderate followers.

On the whole, the Social Democrats, confronted by this dilemma, followed the second course. But the riddle was never wholly resolved, and Bauer himself pursued an uncertain course after 1927. However, he continued, as a rule, to urge moderation on the party, and, in particular, to try to reach some agreement with the other parties as regards disarmament, for he knew that, in the last resort, the Social Democrats could never be as strong as their rivals in this respect. It is probable, however, that apart from this consideration he had a genuine aversion to the idea of physical force.[2] All his violence was of the mind. He was not, however, as Renner and Ellenbogen, on the whole in favour of a coalition, even in 1931, when the danger of the position had become apparent. But he continued

[1] Speech at the Party Conference in 1927.

[2] Speech at the Party Conference in 1926: 'Was klug ist, das sollte man dieser Generation nicht mehr erzählen mussen . . . Bürgerkrieg, das heisst also, dass der Sozialismus, selbst im Falle des Sieges für eine ganze Generation keine Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Lage der Arbeiter bringen kann, sondern eine Verschlechterung bringen muss, weil die Zerstörung des Wirtschaftslebens unvergleichlich mehr ausmacht als die Konfiscation des Mehrwertes.' He was also aware of the inevitable danger of the use of force: 'Wer zur Gewalt greift, der ist der Gefangene der Gewalt.' On the other hand, at the Party Conference in 1929, he expressed the view that the only way to force disarmament on the other side was to arm so effectively as to terrorize the bourgeoisie into acquiescence.

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665 to plead for strict discipline within the party, for he feared that in the last resort the decision would not rest with the Social Democrats but with the interested powers outside Austria, who would intervene in support of the bourgeois groups if it came to an actual test of strength.[1]

It became, however, increasingly difficult to combine revolutionary theory with practical moderation and, from the spring of 1933, it was apparent that the leaders of the Social Democrats were no longer in a position to control the party to whom they had preached revolution for so long.

Another reason for the ascendancy of left-wing elements among the Social Democrats was the fact that almost all the party officials, as well as the leaders, were Jews. The Jewish tendency towards extremism thus accentuated the natural tilt of the party towards the left.

Almost precisely the same forces were at work on the Christian Socialist side. Here also the ablest men were the extremists. Monsignor Seipel, as Bauer, stood head and shoulders above any of his colleagues. He shared with Bauer a belief in general principles, and a tenacity in fighting for what he believed to be right, not often found among Austrian public men. And he succeeded in inspiring Catholic policy in Austria with a fighting spirit hitherto unknown. The price which had to be paid for the rebirth of this more forceful form of political Catholicism was the alliance of the Church with the big Vienna bourgeoisie, who, far more than the Christian Socialist peasants of the Provinces, shared Seipel's hatred of the Social Democrats. Seipel was, however, undoubtedly a very great and very able man. Similarly, to take a few outstanding examples, Vaugoin, who reorganized the army after the war, Funder, the editor of the *Reichspost*, and Mataja, all men of pronouncedly right-wing views, were very much abler than Kunschak, the moderate leader of the Viennese Christian Socialists, or Hemala, the leader of the Christian Trade Unions, or the peasant leader, Reither. And it was the extreme elements who had capital behind them, in shape of support from the big Jewish industrialists.

[1] Speech at the Party Conference of 1931.

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On the other hand, it is certainly true that there were large moderate groups in both camps, who would probably have been ready to work together permanently, within the framework of a democratic parliamentary régime, had the opportunity offered. Men like Renner, for instance, from the beginning explicitly repudiated any connections with communism.[1] And Austerlitz, the left-wing editor of the *Arbeiter Zeitung* and a man of great influence in the party, protested strongly, in 1926, against the tendency of the left-wing leaders to play with the idea of a dictatorship as being the only means of achieving their aims.[2] He said that he considered it nonsense to talk of the 'dictatorship' of the bourgeoisie since the war.

The views of these moderate elements did undoubtedly have a very considerable influence over the policy of the party, and, as has been pointed out, even the extremists for the most part subscribed to them as a temporary expedient when the unrest in the country began to assume really serious proportions. Thus, in 1929, the party put forward a strong plea for the disbandment of all private armed forces and for moderation.[3] It is probable, of course, that many of the men who advocated the adoption of this policy of co-operation and moderation believed, like Seitz,[4] Bauer, and Austerlitz, that it was only the means to the end, which was the triumph of the proletarian revolution. But it is also probable that many of those who paid lip-service to the revolutionary ideal were, at heart, far from averse to a permanent co-operation with their rivals. —Men like Renner, for instance, who refused even to pay lip-service,[5] advocated not only disarmament, but also the forma-

[1] Speech at the Linz Conference, 1926.

[2] Speech at the Linz Conference, 1926: 'Wenn der Parteitag zu erkennen gäbe, dass er die Demokratie geringschätzt, dass er in ihr keine wesentliche Errungenschaft wahrnimmt, so würde das sicherlich auch zu einer Minderung unserer Anziehungskraft auf die breite Masse führen.'

[3] Report of 1929 Party Conference: 'Der Parteitag betrachtet die vollständige innere Abrüstung, die restlose Auflösung aller Wehrformationen als das wirksamste Mittel, die friedliche, demokratische Entwickelung der Volkswirtschaft u. den stetigen Aufstieg der Arbeiterklasse sicherzustellen.'

[4] Speech at the 1930 Party Conference: 'Wir wollen keinen Krieg . . . wir wollen Frieden u. Arbeit. Wir werden mithelfen, wenn ihr sie wollt.'

[5] Speech at the 1927 Party Conference: '. . . es ist eine Gefahr u. ein Widerspruch, immer von Revolutionen zu reden, u. zugleich behaupten zu müssen, dass man sie nicht machen könne.'

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665 tion of a coalition with the moderate bourgeois groups. He was acutely conscious of the dangers of the situation after 1927, when the tempo of rearmament was increasing rapidly on both sides.[1] He pointed out at the Party Conference of 1930 that the elections had shown the existence of a large democratic majority of moderate views, and the dislike of the people for the extremist groups. This democratic majority should group itself round the Social Democrats.[2] Renner did not advocate a lasting alliance with any of the bourgeois groups, but he thought that the party should agree to temporary co-operation with those who stood for democratic principles. He was more conscious than any of the other party leaders at that time of the dangers implicit in the Nazi movement.[3] He was, however, too right-wing in his views for the party as a whole, and was never in a really influential position. Bauer, however, was, by 1930, also well aware of the dangers of intransigent opposition.[4] In fact, the chances for the triumph of a policy of co-operation might appear to have been considerable round about 1930.

[1] Speech at the Party Conference of 1927: 'Rüstung u. Gegenrüstung erzeugen eine Kriegspsychose unter den Bürgern desselben Staates, die es dahin bringen kann, dass nur einmal irgendwo zufällig ein Gewehr losgeht, und der Bürgerkrieg ist da.'

[2] Renner at Party Conference, 1930: 'Diese demokratisch fühlende Mehrheit sieht in uns ihr Zentrum u. ihre Führung, an sie schliessen sich Schober Block u. Landbund an, an sie lehnt sich der demokratisch denkende Flügel der Christlichsozialen an. Das wäre ja immer als die Zweidrittelmehrheit im Parlament. Warum bildet diese Zweidrittelmehrheit nicht eine Regierung.'

[3] Speech at the 1930 Party Conference: 'Der eigentlich gefährliche Gegner, der noch nicht da ist . . . ist der Nationalsozialismus. Und dieser Nationalsozialismus ist es deshalb, weil er vom Sozialismus die Ausserlichkeiten, die äussere Form u. gewisse Einzelheiten herausnimmt u. aufpflanzt auf den reaktionären Boden wirtschaftlich verzweifelten Menschen, der es ihnen möglich macht, zugleich die grimmigsten Feinde der Arbeiterklasse, die grimmigsten Feinde des Sozialismus zu sein, u. sich doch Sozialisten zu nennen.'

[4] Speech at Party Conference, 1930: 'Unsere Aufgabe muss sein zu verhindern, dass der Fascismus wieder in die Regierung komme. Wir müssen daher die gegenwärtige Regierung, obwohl es nicht unsere Regierung ist, obwohl es eine bürgerliche Regierung ist, obwohl Reaktionäre in ihr sitzen, trotzdem zu stützen versuchen, damit der Kurs nicht wieder nach rechts wieder in die Richtung Vaugoin—Stahremberg zurückfällt.'

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Other developments, however, combined to play into the hands of the extreme elements on both sides. Economic conditions, for instance, contributed towards the growth of revolutionary tendencies, and the desire for desperate remedies, among the working classes; while among the propertied classes, increases in taxation, especially those imposed by the Vienna Socialist municipality, sharpened aristocratic yearnings for a return to pre-war conditions.

The control exercised by foreign Powers over Austrian economic and foreign policy also served to bring the whole system of parliamentary democracy into disrepute. This form of government was, as has been pointed out, in any case regarded by the extreme groups on both sides as a temporary expedient, and such an attitude grew more and more prevalent when it became apparent that parliamentary democracy was nothing more than a façade behind which Austria's foreign creditors worked their will. Again, economic conditions sharpened the already existing antagonism between the Provinces and Vienna. And, because economic necessity made imperative a modification of the federal structure of Austria, the hostility of the conservative peasants and land-owning classes forced into closer relationship with Vienna found partial expression in movements like the *Heimwehr*. The history of Austria from 1927 till 1934 is the story of force feeding upon force. Both antagonists armed because their rivals did so, although the moderates on both sides were willing to disarm if the other party would do so first.

The turning-point came with the splitting-up of the *Bürgerblock* in the 1930 elections, for with the defection of the Schober group the main body of the party was compelled to turn to extreme right-wing elements for support in its struggle against the Social Democrats. The anti-socialist front tended to split up more and more as time went on, for, after the failure of the attempted *Anschluss* in 1931, the German Nationalists began to drift right away into the Nazi camp, leaving their erstwhile allies with no alternative to the *Heimwehr*. Thus the divisions in Christian Socialist ranks, though they gave temporary encouragement to the Social Democrats, were in reality

665 669 666 the beginning of the end, for reliance on the *Heimwehr* led almost inevitably to the crushing of the Social Democrats in 1934.[1]

665 668 The victory of the extremists was also in part a consequence of the tendency of both sides towards what may be described as party totalitarianism. This was especially the case on the Social Democrat side, for the tendency of the *Bürgerblock* to split up into small groups prevented this principle from working out so fully in their case. The Social Democrats, however, had from the beginning laid particular emphasis on the need for presenting a united front to the outside world, and had, indeed, been conspicuously successful in doing so.[2] They tried, with this end in view, to prevent the members of the party from coming into contact with people of other opinions who might influence them and draw them away from the Party orbit.[3] They therefore laboured to build up Social Democrat societies which would cover all a member's activities from the cradle to the grave. His intellectual and physical needs were all catered for within the party. The party provided him with his flat; built kindergartens for his children, organized sport clubs, literary clubs, political clubs, and social clubs for himself and his wife; took charge of his economic life, negotiating on his behalf with his bourgeois employers; and even provided burial clubs for his death. The organization of the Social

[1] It is interesting to note that Renner had drawn the attention of the party to this danger as early as 1929. He had urged that the Social Democrats should not make things too difficult for their opponents. 'Wir müssen mit unserem Bürgertum manchmal Geduld haben, auch in der Heimwehrsache.' (Speech at the 1924 Party Conference.) In 1930 he again drew attention, at the Party Conference, to this danger; although Seitz, on this occasion, spoke cheerfully of the approaching triumph of the Social Democrats.

[2] *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 9 January 1919. 'Es ist für das Proletariat weniger gefährlich, wenn es vorübergehend einen falschen Weg, aber diesen Weg einig u. geschlossen geht, als wenn es sich im Streit um den richtigen Weg spaltet. . . . Hundertmal lieber einen falschen Weg einig gehen—denn Fehler kann man dann wieder korrigieren—als um des rechten Weges willen, uns spalten.' (Bauer, at Party Conference, 1927.)

[3] It was even laid down, at the Linz Conference in 1926, that no member of the party could, without permission, carry on work which meant his appearance in public life with people who were members of other parties.

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Democratic party in Vienna[1] was as a state within a state. The members scarcely became acquainted with the real bourgeois standpoint because they had no opportunity of mixing in bourgeois society.

The *Bürgerblock* never succeeded in organizing themselves in this way to anything like the same extent, because the interests of their members were much less susceptible of amalgamation. It is true that the Social Democrats included both Communist and *petit bourgeoisie* elements and a certain proportion of peasant elements. But the interests of these groups were nothing like so divergent as those of, for instance, the peasants and the industrialists of the *Bürgerblock*, nor were they numerous enough or strong enough to exercise much influence within the party. None the less, the same tendency towards totalitarianism may be seen working out in sections of the *Bürgerblock*. The *Heimwehr*, for instance, made strenuous efforts to attract all the various groups into their orbit. Their avowed aim was the abolition of party government.[2] This policy was the subject of violent and bitter attack from the Social Democrats. But, in fact, the attitude of both sides was equally inimical to parliamentary democracy, the only difference being that the Social Democrats succeeded in uniting their party, while the *Heimwehr* split up theirs yet further.

It is easy to see that the extreme emphasis of the Social Democrats on party organization in effect nullified the proper working of the constitution just as much as the *Heimwehr* movement. For instance, although the constitution had provided specifically for the representation of all shades of opinion by detailed provisions for proportional representation, the Social Democrats deliberately aimed at the elimination of differences of opinion among the workers. In so doing, they not only prevented the normal working of the proportional representation system by transforming their party into a mili-

[1] Organization was naturally less complete in the Provinces, where the party was numerically very much weaker, 52 per cent. of the party members being Viennese. For the relative strength of the party in the different provinces, see the Party Protocol, 1925.

[2] See the Korneuberger Programme of 18 May 1930. (P. T. Lux, *La Lutte en l'Autriche, 1919–37*, p. 81.)

665 668 tant and educative rather than a representative group, they almost made impossible the working of any form of parliamentary democracy, which must depend, in the last analysis, upon the possibility of people altering their opinions, compromising now on one issue, now on another, and moving from party to party. A rigid division between two or more groups in a state must make the whole system unworkable because a temporary majority thus becomes a permanent one, and the minority is faced with the alternative of permanent exclusion from power, or revolution. Moreover, the elaborate party structure necessary for the building-up of this totalitarian system almost inevitably places an undesirable amount of power in the hands of the party organizers, who become the real rulers of the state. This certainly tended to be the case in Austria.

In spite, however, of the fact that the party organizations, which were controlled by the more extreme elements on both sides, tended to separate the people into exclusive groups, the divergence in interests and outlook between the peasants and the workers, who formed the main bulk of the population, may easily be overestimated. It is true that the peasants were, in an overwhelming majority, conservative in their outlook, if by conservatism is meant adherence to private property. And it is true that the Social Democrats wished to substitute state for private ownership. On the other hand, the majority of the Social Democratic leaders realized from the start that they would only be able to put their theories into practice very slowly, and with great care, as far as the peasantry were concerned. The fact that conditions in Austria were entirely different from those in Russia, where the peasants had been willing to co-operate with the revolutionaries, because of their desire for land, was fully grasped. In Austria, there were comparatively few big estates, and the peasantry, although not prosperous, had a long tradition of semi-independence behind them. Any attempt forcibly to expropriate their property would have been, it was well understood, foredoomed to failure. A policy of peaceful permeation was the only feasible one. For this reason wholesale expropriation of privately

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owned land at no time formed part of the Social Democrats' programme.[1]

On the other hand, the party was, from the beginning, acutely conscious of the necessity of extending its influence among the peasantry.[2] In 1925 an official agricultural programme was drawn up. This programme provided for the retention of peasant ownership, although the big estates were to be expropriated.[3] The Social Democrats hoped, however, by a lavish expenditure on agricultural colleges and institutes, to educate the peasantry gradually to more scientific methods of farming, which would probably, in the end, mean amalgamation of small holdings, and a greatly increased State control.[4]

The party laid great emphasis also on the need for improving the position of the smaller peasants who had suffered from the inclosure of common land[5] and the conditions of work of the hired labourers. These latter lived, as a rule, in the peasant houses—or rather, in the stables—and their standard of living

[1] Article in the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 26 March 1919, 'Arbeiter u. Bauern'. Bauer's speech at the Party Conference, 1925: 'Nicht mit Gewaltakten, nicht mit Gesetzen, sondern mit einem organischen Anpassungsprozess an die sozialistische Umgebung wird sich die Bauernschaft in die neue sozialistische Gesellschaft eingliedern.'

Also Bauer, *Der Kampf um Wald u. Weide*, 1925. See speeches made at 1927 Party Conference, on agricultural policy.

[2] Bauer, 'Leitsätze zur Agrarpolitik', *Kampf*, July 1921: 'Jeder weitere Fortschritt der proletarischen Revolution setzt die Eroberung stärkerer Machtpositionen in den Dörfern u. auf den Gutshöfen voraus.'

[3] The policy had been put forward in the *Arbeiter Zeitung* as early as 10 January 1919: 'Der Sozialismus will das Ausbeutungseigentum überwinden, nicht das Arbeitseigentum. Der Grund u. Boden des Adels, der Kirche, u. der Kapitalisten soll vergesellschaftet werden; der Grund u. Boden des Bauern soll sein Privateigentum bleiben.'

[4] 'Über die Tatsache, dass von einer Expropriation der Bauernschaft keine Rede sein kann, war nie ein Zweifel.' (Bauer, Party Conference, 1925.) On the other hand, in the Linz Programme of 1926, it was envisaged that if amalgamation of property was required in the public interest, and if it was impossible to get the parties concerned to agree to it, amalgamation might be forced upon them. However, it was again laid down that 'der Sozialismus bekämpft das Raubeigentum der Herrenklassen, nicht das Arbeitseigentum der Bauern'. The peasant would, in fact, be in a stronger position than ever, after the liquidation of his capitalist creditors.

[5] The *Kleinbauernverband* was founded in 1923, and held its first Party Conference in Vienna in 1925. Membership was strongest in Lower Austria (3,500) and Kärnten (1,330).

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was extremely low. The Social Democrats regarded them with great interest, as a potentially socialist element in the population, and agitated constantly for the building of separate houses for them, and for better working conditions, etc.[1] In those Provinces where hired labour formed a considerable element in the working population, the Social Democrats made good headway, but it cannot be said that their agricultural programme on the whole met with any considerable measure of success.

On the other hand, although the peasants showed a lack of interest in the abuses of women's labour, the problem of alcohol, the fate of the hired labourer, and other questions which exercised the Social Democrats, they were by far the most staunch supporters of democratic government.[2]

The hostility of men like Dr. Ender to the Viennese socialists after the war was not so much based on dislike of their democratic proclivities as on opposition to their policy of centralization. The *Bauernbund*, led by Dr. Reither, frequently protested against the reactionary politics of the Christian Socialist party leaders. And although it is true that a considerable number joined the *Heimwehr*, and later a very much larger number the Nazis, it is probable that the rank and file of the Austrian peasantry remained to the end supporters of the democratic principle.

Again, although it is true that the peasantry were, on the whole, Catholic in outlook, while the workers had drifted away from the Church, and were for the most part indifferent, if not hostile, in their attitude towards it, this divergence must not be overestimated. The lower clergy, who worked among the peasants, were very much more democratic in their views than their ecclesiastical superiors. The overwhelming majority were themselves of peasant stock and tended, therefore, to share the outlook of their flocks.[3] There were indications in 1932, for instance, that many of them strongly disapproved of the attitude adopted by their superiors towards the *Heimwehr*.

[1] See Bauer's speech on the Agrarian Programme of the Social Democrats at the 1925 Party Conference.

[2] Tyrol and Vorarlberg, in particular, looked back proudly on a centuries-old tradition of self-government.

[3] The higher clergy were also, for the most part, men of humble origin. e.g. Monsignor Seipel, Cardinal Innitzer.

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In any case, the extent of clerical influence among the peasantry can easily be overestimated. The Austrians were not prone to take their religious life too seriously; and attempts made by the Church to extend its influence outside purely religious matters were not regarded with approval.[1] Anti-clericalism had its roots far back in the past, and had antedated by many decades the challenge of the socialists and the emergence of the Nazi party.

But if the clericalism of the conservative peasantry can easily be overestimated, so can the anti-clericalism of the Social Democrats. It is true that the party were prepared to fight what may be termed 'political Catholicism' because this was considered to be a force dangerous to the party.[2] But the Free Thinkers, who were actively hostile to the Church, were very small in number, and were strongly discouraged in their activities by Bauer, Renner, and most of the other leaders.[3] And, while it is true that the rank and file of the party were passively hostile to the Church, or at least, indifferent to its claims, certain leaders, as Ellenbogen and Leuthner, stated unequivocally that they considered this a source of weakness rather than of strength, to the party, and were anxious to see a revival of religion in the ranks of the Social Democrats.[4]

[1] On 20 October 1931, for instance, the *Neue Freie Presse* drew attention to the big peasant meeting, 4,000 strong, which had taken place at S. Johann im Pongau, and remarked that the peasants had demonstrated 'nicht nur gegen die Regierung u. die Parteipolitik, sondern auch gegen die politisierenden Geistlichen'.

[2] See the report prepared by the party executive for the Party Conference at Linz in 1926: 'Die römische Kirche übt ihre grosse Macht über die Seelen der breiten Massen, die ihrer Klassenlage nach, zu der Arbeiterklasse gehören, dazu aus, um sie von der Teilnahme an dem Befreiungskampf der Arbeiterklasse fernzuhalten, u. diese Massen in der Gefolgschaft bürgerlicher Parteien zu erhalten. . . . Dadurch stützt die römische Kirche die Herrschaft der Bourgeoisie.'

[3] Speech by Renner at the 1925 Social Democratic Party Conference, when the whole question was discussed: 'Ich möchte aber das eine betonen: es ist auch in dem Staat nicht Sache der Sozialdemokratie Partei, Religion u. Kirche zu bekämpfen.'

[4] Speech by Leuthner at the 1926 Party Conference: 'Im tiefsten Grund entstehen Religionen aus dem eingebornen, ewigen, unsterblichen u. durch nichts zu unterdrückenden Drang des gesamten Menschheitsgeschlechtes nach Erklärung der letzten Ursachen der Dinge.' He registered a strong protest against the attempt of the Free Thinkers to make acceptance of their creed the *sine qua non* of socialism. Cf. with speech of Preis: 'Seine Apostel'

Otto Bauer,[1] a simple workman, organized a group within the party known as the 'Religious Socialists'. He succeeded in establishing some contacts with the more sympathetic of the clergy.[2] The hostility of the Church, however, prevented the movement from achieving any considerable success.[3]

The policy of the Church itself was not, however, at any rate for the first seven years of the Republic, as reactionary as is sometimes supposed. After the breakdown the Bishops professed unequivocally their loyalty to the Republican régime[4] and there seems no reason to question the sincerity of this declaration. In 1925 they issued a Pastoral Letter which showed marked sympathy with the claims of the working classes,[5] although they were not prepared to tolerate any compromise with the Social Democrats.[6]

After 1927, however, conditions changed for the worse in this, as in so many other respects. The episcopate had been aroused by the anti-clerical programme which had been decided on by the Social Democratic Party Conference at Linz in 1926 (in spite of protest from the moderate element

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(Free Thinkers) 'haben an Intoleranz ungefähr dasselbe geleistet wie die Vertreter aller übrigen Religionen zusammen.' And Mentasti pointed out that opposition to alcohol and opposition to the churches meant opposition to the only forms of relaxation open to the peasants.

[1] Not to be confused with his famous namesake, one of the greatest of the Social Democrats.

[2] e.g. with Prof. Fliegler.

[3] It was condemned by the Bishops in 1930 (see Kungebung, *Des österreichischen Episkopates zur sozialen Frage*, January 1930.)

[4] See pronouncement made by Cardinal Piffl, 4 November 1918: 'Treue gegenüber der Republik.' Pastoral Letter of the Bishops and Archbishops, 23 January 1919, in defence of democracy. (Knoll, A. M., Von Seipel zu Dollfuss, 1934, pp. 44–7.)

[5] See Knoll, op. cit., pp. 48–59. 'Uber Politik, Volkswirtschaft u. Moral. Demokratie u. Neue Staatsform.' The letter inveighed against the evils of capitalism in the strongest terms, because of the lack of regard shown by its leaders for the natural rights of the workers, and their attempt to dominate public life. 'Bei Gott ist kein Unterschied zwischen der Seele der Fabrikarbeiters u. der Seele des Fabrikherrn.' In April 1926, further instructions were issued to priests, urging them to inveigh against the usurious exploitation of the workers.

[6] In April 1926, Roman Catholics were forbidden, except under special circumstances, to join Social Democratic Trade Unions, or to vote for Social Democrats. (Knoll, op. cit., p. 135, 'Instructio pro clero in re soziali'.)

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in the party). And the fighting in Vienna in 1927, which, partly owing to the drastic measures taken to repress the rioters by Seipel's Government, resulted in thousands of people leaving the Church, and deflected episcopal policy decidedly to the right. Seipel, for his part, turned to the anti-working-class big industrialists for support against what he conceived to be the danger *par excellence*. The hostile attitude of the Church towards the Schober Block at the November elections of 1930 occasioned much scandal.[1]

It would, however, probably be a mistake to regard the Church as the villain of the piece even after 1927. It continued to evince great interest in social problems.[2] And although the higher clergy, and perhaps the majority of the lower clergy, regarded the *Heimwehr* movement with favour, as being a useful weapon for curbing socialist influence, they could not be very enthusiastic about a movement so deeply tinged with Nazi anti-clericalism.[3]

Although it is true that in the two main groups, the Social Democrats and the Christian Socialists, the balance of power tended to pass to the extreme wings, other important groups existed who were much more moderate in their outlook, and who stood unequivocally for democratic government. The *Landbund*, for instance, an organization supported chiefly by the more wealthy peasants led by Herr Winkler, inveighed constantly against the fascist proclivities of the Christian Socialists and the *Heimwehr*. Even in 1929, when it supported a reorganization of the state on a corporative basis, hoping thereby to secure a better representation of agricultural interests, its members emphasized the fact that the movement

[1] *Stellungnahme zu den österreichischen Nationalratswahlen*, 9 November 1930, 26 October 1930. (See Knoll, op. cit., pp. 167–77.)

[2] Lent Pastoral Letter, 1928, inveighing against low wages of women and bad housing. *Fasten Hirtenbrief der Erzbischöfe u. Bischöfe Österreichs*, 1928. (Knoll, op. cit., pp. 150–3.)

[3] In January 1930 a declaration was issued declaring that the Church could not consecrate the flags of political parties—'Politischen Vereinen ist mit Rücksicht auf die überparteiliche Stellung der Kirche die Weihe der Fahnen nicht zu bewilligen'.

See also the Lent Pastoral Letter, February 1932, issued by all the Bishops, warning the people against the Nazis.

wanted a genuine, democratic organization, not fascism of the Italian variety.[1]

The *Bauernbund* was another peasant organization strongly democratic in its views. It represented a different section of peasant opinion, and was distinguished from the *Landbund* chiefly by the fact that it was strongly clerical in tone, whereas the *Landbund* was anti-clerical. But it was, if anything, even more staunch to the democratic principle and, from 1929 on, protested frequently against the authoritarian leanings of its wealthier counterpart.[2] Most of the peasants were organized in one or other of these groups.

The Viennese counterpart of the *Bauernbund* was the *Freiheitsbund* of Herr Kunschak. This organization was much more decidedly democratic in outlook than either of the peasant organizations, and emphasized constantly the dangers of right-wing extremism.[3]

This movement was closely associated with the Christian Trade Union movement, led by Dr. Hemala. But it was in the nature of things difficult for a Christian Socialist workingmen's organization to offer attractions to the workers comparable with those of the very much larger and wealthier Social Democratic organization. The group was on the whole disliked by both parties, and never achieved a strong position. Herr Kunschak's reiterated warnings to the Christian Socialists for the most part fell on barren ground.

Finally, reference must be made to the Schober Block, which appeared in 1930 as a group of moderate bourgeois parties, united by opposition to the fascist proclivities of the *Heimwehr* and the Social Democrats.

From this brief analysis of the structure of opinion in Austria in the post-war years, it is clear that, although forces were at work which made the successful working out of democratic

[1] At a later stage, the *Landbund* lost many members to the Nazis. And the attitude of the whole group towards this question was somewhat equivocal.

[2] Some of the local *Bauernbund* groups, however, supported the *Heimwehr*, and it is not easy to discover what proportion of the peasants were behind them. It is probable that opinion was fluctuating a good deal between 1928 and 1932.

[3] The views of this group were represented in Herr Kunschak's paper, the *Weltblatt*, a pronouncedly democratic organ.

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665 668 government difficult, its roots among the people were strong. And it is just possible that had the Nazi party not appeared on the scene, and forced the Christian Socialists into a position of dependence on the *Heimwehr*, some compromise with the Social Democrats might have been found possible. But the fact that the *Heimwehr*, the only element wealthy and strong enough to provide a defence against the Nazis, was in a position of financial dependence on the Italians, who were thus in a position to dictate their terms, made the destruction of the Social Democrats almost inevitable.

3: Hiscocks G-4, 5 (1946-1949) 1953 EK1 Austria EK1

should be incorporated in the German Republic, in the event of the peace treaty permitting such a development. The Provincial Assemblies of Salzburg and the Tyrol decided to hold plebiscites on the subject, both of which resulted in overwhelming majorities in favour of union with Germany. In the Tyrol 144,342 votes were cast for the *Anschluss* and 1,794 against. In Salzburg the figures were 103,000 for and 800 against.

In spite of these clear indications of popular opinion, the victorious Powers opposed any increase in German territory. The Treaty of St. Germain, in September 1919, established Austria as an independent State and forebade any modification of its independence without the consent of the League of Nations. In 1931, when the economic crisis led the Austrian and German Governments to plan a Customs Union between the two countries, the project was forbidden as contrary to the treaty terms. C. A. Macartney's laconic statement that French fear of the Germans on the Rhine was 'an insufficient reason for condemning Austria to be alive' summed up the feelings of many Austrians.

In addition to its fundamental weaknesses, the Austrian Republic lacked the required conditions for successful democratic government.

A prerequisite of sound democracy is a sense of common purpose. Party rivalry is essential to the democratic system, but it must take place within the framework of loyalty to the State. On the whole, in the First Austrian Republic party sentiment was stronger than patriotism. Of the two main political parties, the Social Democrats were convinced, though moderate, disciples of Marx, believing in the international character of Socialism and not uninfluenced by Marx's theory of class dictatorship. The Christian Socialists, though made up of peasants and industrialists as well as clericals, were predominantly Catholic and traditionalist in sympathy, many of them with monarchist leanings. Both sides tended to attach more importance to realizing their political ideals than to establishing effective government in the new State.

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642 The Republican Constitution approved in October 1922 was itself a handicap. It was drawn up by a coalition government, in which the different views and mutual suspicions of the two parties did not make for clarity or simplicity of structure. Neither side could be described as experts in democratic practice, and the Social Democrats had an exaggerated fear of a strong executive. So the formidable political and economic problems facing the young State had to be tackled by a succession of weak governments which had no power to dissolve Parliament. As the system of proportional representation made for an even balance between the parties, a state of chronic instability prevailed. No real improvement was made in the Constitution until 1929, and even then reforms were limited to those on which the two main parties could agree, owing to the rule that any constitutional change required approval by a two-thirds majority.

665 The situation in the new Republic called for a concentration of political forces. But party feeling was such that the coalition lasted for only two years, and in the autumn of 1920 a long period of bitter and uncompromising conflict began. Attempts made on both sides to renew collaboration all ended in failure, and Dr. Renner, a consistent exponent of co-operation and compromise, had comparatively little influence.

665 668 Although universal suffrage had been introduced in the Habsburg Empire in 1907, the democratic immaturity of the Republic was revealed by the prevalent political methods. The Social Democrats first tried to establish control of the official army. When this attempt had failed, both parties organized private armies of their own, and thus showed that in the last resort they were prepared to use force as well as argument. The bad habit developed of using mass demonstrations for political purposes, an undemocratic technique, because it appeals to emotions and mass suggestion rather than to reason. Its full dangers became clear under the Nazis, but before then it had done great harm to Austrian political life. A mass demonstration in 1927 led to riots and savage repression and accentuated party antagonism. By 1934 Parliament had

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665 668 been suspended by the Dollfuss Government and the country was on the verge of civil war. The Government's harsh and ill-considered decision to turn artillery on to the workers' dwellings may have cut short the conflict and suffering, but it was a final betrayal of democracy that no considerations of expediency can excuse.

721 In spite of the serious internal difficulties, it was in the end to external force that the Austrian Republic succumbed. On the 11th of March 1938 Hitler sent an ultimatum to Dr. Schuschnigg, the Chancellor. Within a few hours German troops had occupied the country and the *Anschluss* was a fact. The Austrian political parties have accused each other of preparing the way for this tragedy, but there were deep-lying causes for the growth of National Socialism and Fascism that were beyond their power to prevent. In the diplomatic circumstances of the time, even had Austria been a model democracy, it would have had no more chance of withstanding Hitler than had the courage, patriotism, and democratic example of the Czechs. As the only German country outside the Reich, Austria was the first object of Hitler's ambition. The opening page of *Mein Kampf* contains the sentence: 'German-Austria must return to the great German Mother Country'.

186 648 In fact, by 1938 the attitude of Austrians towards union with Germany had changed considerably. Inside Austria nearly twenty years of enforced independence had inevitably left their mark: the people were acquiring a sense of pride in their achievement and hope for the future. Recent developments in Germany also had had a decisive effect.

433 Economically Austria had made important progress. In 1918 its position seemed hopeless. But the Austrian Government and people gradually accustomed themselves to the idea that their fate was in their own hands. By 1937 the country was producing three-quarters of its food. Valuable oil-fields had been discovered at Zistersdorf, north-east of Vienna, and oil production had risen from 73 tons in 1932 to 32,849 tons in 1938. The tourist industry had developed rapidly and covered over 80 per cent of the country's trade deficit. When the

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of deep patriotism. In spite of the sordid conditions and immense difficulties, an atmosphere of happy adventure and exhilaration surrounded the whole operation. As one official who took part in it remarked: 'After all, it is not often that one has an opportunity to build up a State.'

In the work of political and economic reconstruction the Provisional Government received the support and assistance of the Russian military authorities. As will be seen, the Russians at this time were beginning to carry out the systematic confiscation of economic assets which was part of their post-War policy. But this was accompanied by a positive and helpful attitude towards the Government itself. It would be quite wrong to attribute to the Russians at this period the political obstruction they practised later. Buildings were made available for Government departments. There was no interference with the Cabinet's deliberations, and the laws were, with very few exceptions, given tacit approval. In fact, the Provisional Government felt free and unrestricted in the immense legislative task with which it was faced. After all, the Government was a Russian creation, and the Russians must be given credit for the selection of Renner. The fact that he turned out to be a better choice from the Austrian than from the Russian point of view is beside the point.

The Austrian Communists also, in their own way, furthered the work of the Provisional Government. In view of the key positions they held, this was really to be expected. With Russian support they had obtained much fuller representation in the Cabinet than their strength in the country warranted. In addition to providing Under-Secretaries and a member of the Political Cabinet Council, they held the all-important Ministries of the Interior and Education, which were responsible respectively for security and 'public enlightenment'. But the Communists also contributed to the success of the Government for another curious and surprising reason.

Very soon after the arrival of the Russians the chosen leaders of the Austrian Communist Party flew into Vienna in Russian aeroplanes: Ernst Fischer and Johann Koplenig from Moscow,

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and Franz Honner and Friedl Fürnberg from Yugoslavia. They came with a well-thought-out programme which was followed consistently during the lifetime of the Provisional Government. Two themes were to be stressed repeatedly: the idea of Austria and its national tradition and the need for democratic solidarity and a united front. As a result, Communist leaders were to be found saying and writing some unexpected things during the following months. At an all-party meeting in the middle of April the question of education in Vienna was discussed. Ernst Fischer spoke with such enthusiasm of the need for instilling patriotism and an appreciation of the great achievements of such historic figures as the Empress Maria Theresa and Prinz Eugene that Leopold Kunschak remarked drily to a friend afterwards that he thought at any minute Fischer might spring up and start singing 'Gott erhalte unsern Kaiser', the old Imperial national anthem. Many efforts were also made by the Communists to persuade the other parties to collaborate in the foundation of joint democratic or supra-party organizations, in which they hoped to exercise the controlling influence. The Socialists and the People's Party did not respond to these overtures. For example, on one occasion Dr. Schärf and Dr. Hurdes discovered that a poster had been printed without reference to them announcing the formation of an all-party youth movement, known as the 'Free Austrian Youth'. At the bottom of the poster their names appeared by the side of that of the Communist leader concerned. Their reply was to proceed with the formation of youth movements for each of their own parties. The 'Free Austrian Youth', however, now a Communist organization, still retain as their flag the Red-White-Red of the Austrian national colours, which their founder had hopefully given them.

The real implications of this programme can only be understood in connexion with the post-War record of the Communists in Central and Eastern Europe. But it had the temporary advantage of facilitating their co-operation with the Provisional Government's efforts to rebuild and re-unite

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the Austrian State. Certain Communist utterances at the time had a considerable appeal to Austrian sentiment. To the first number of *Neues Österreich* Ernst Fischer, who was the editor, contributed an article entitled ' With United Strength'. It ended as follows:—

> And something more is necessary: that we Austrians awake to true national self-consciousness, that we have confidence in our own strength, as we have not always had in the past. . . .
>
> Hard work lies ahead of us, but it is work for ourselves. After long years of servitude, we can work for ourselves again, for the happiness of our children, for the welfare of our people, for a free independent Austria. With united strength we will overcome all the accumulated difficulties and make of our homeland what it deserves to be: a land of peace, freedom and creative human endeavour. And when the drab needs of everyday life get a hold on us, our ardent faith in Austria will rouse us again to action.
>
> Our great composer, Schubert, has bequeathed us his ever beautiful unfinished symphony. Everything around us now is unfinished: fragments, ruins, the sadness of destruction. Nevertheless we hear more clearly than ever before the urgent, admonishing notes of the unfinished symphony—Austria. We shall finish it.

It was an inspiring call. But there are no signs now that the symphony will be finished in the way Ernst Fischer had in mind.

The legal situation that faced the Provisional Government when it took office was very complex. The most urgent need was to define the constitutional position of the Government. This was done with the help of two constitutional laws that were approved on the 13th of May and made effective from the 1st of May 1945. The first of these declared that the Austrian constitution of 1929, as it stood on the 5th of March 1933, was again in force, and the second modified the first by stating that until the formation of a government based on free elections the Provisional Government was to exercise the supreme executive power in the State and the legislative authority previously held by the Federal Parliament and the provincial assemblies. It was of immediate importance also to settle the question of the legislation and decrees issued by the

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666 Europe after the War, the fairness of the Austrian elections has caused some surprise, but this is largely due to a misunderstanding of Austrian conditions at the time.

In the first place, the influence of the Western Allies was exerted wholeheartedly in favour of freedom and impartiality, and, supported by them, the Austrian Government made sensible and efficient arrangements, including precautions against possible malpractice. A special commission was set up to supervise the elections, comprising two members of the People's Party, two Socialists, and one Communist, with Dr. Sommer, a Right-Wing Under-Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior, as Chairman. Polling day was fixed for November, before mountainous districts were likely to be snowed up, and the procedure was simplified so that ballot boxes, as far as possible, could be collected for counting before dark. Free expression of opinion during the campaign was possible through the newspapers of the three main political parties that had been started early in August.

Secondly, the Russians and the Austrian Communists co-operated to carry through the elections with reasonable fairness and had little temptation to do otherwise. There is every indication that the Austrian Communists were more optimistic than the outcome warranted and that the Russians were confident of a fairly favourable result from the Communist point of view. Some were convinced they would obtain 40 per cent of the votes. For several months before the elections senior Russian officers invited the leaders of the People's Party and the Socialists separately to meet them at the Imperial Hotel, when, amongst other matters, the election prospects were discussed. On one occasion the People's Party representatives pointed out that the Communists had the advantage of motor fuel from Russian sources; whereupon they were asked to name their party's needs and obtained an allocation of two tons the next day.

666 665 The elections resulted in the People's Party obtaining 1,598,444 votes and 85 seats, the Socialists 1,428,441 votes and 76 seats, and the Communists 174,387 votes and 4 seats. This

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was a striking proof of the persistence of party loyalties in Austria, in spite of all that had happened during the previous twenty-five years. Both in 1919 and 1930 the Right Wing had obtained the most votes and the Socialists had followed quite closely behind. In 1930 the Socialists had obtained just over 41 per cent of the votes, and the Communists, without the moral support of a strong occupying Power, less than 1 per cent.

For the victory of the Austrian People's Party there were three main reasons. The great majority of peasants were conservative; the party appealed to the country's growing patriotic sentiment, in contrast to the Socialist tendency towards Marxist internationalism, and the majority sympathized with Dollfuss and Schuschnigg in their insoluble dilemma and did not look upon them as Fascist betrayers of democracy.

On the other hand, the Social Democrats had as much reason to be satisfied with the result of an election, in which they had appreciably increased their proportionate strength. Their improved position was due to their strong party discipline and loyalty, the lasting value of their social achievement, and the fact that their party had never compromised in its opposition to Fascists and Nazis.

The Communist failure was of great significance. The Russians themselves were bitterly disappointed and offended by the election result and have never quite forgiven the Austrian Communists either for their failure or for their mistaken estimate of the position. But the Russians had only themselves to blame. There is no doubt that the Austrian workers, after their experiences under Dollfuss in 1934 and during seven years of Nazi domination, were ready for a complete change and genuinely welcomed the Russians as liberators. But the harsh and arbitrary record of the Red Army, the looting and bestial behaviour of some of the Russian troops, especially towards women, completely changed their attitude. If such things were the result of the Communist experiment, it was an experiment the Austrian people had no wish to make. Dr. Renner once remarked that Stalin had made only two mistakes: he had shown Central Europe

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first decisions of the new Parliament, therefore, when it met on the 19th of December, was to adopt the constitution of 1929. Dr. Renner, in his New Year's Eve broadcast to the Austrian people, emphasized that the laws issued by his Government had been dictated by the force of circumstance and must now be verified by the people's representatives.

There were compelling reasons for having a coalition. In times of great emergency it is a healthy democratic instinct that brings political parties together to work in the common cause. Britain resorted to coalitions in both World Wars, and the First Austrian Republic had done so in the first two years of its life. The problems facing the country in 1945 were as difficult, if not so fundamental, as those that presented themselves in 1919. There was still an acute shortage of food and fuel. Although the country had gained a measure of unity since the recognition of the Central Government by the occupying Powers, the zonal frontiers remained, and each Power had special rights in its own zone. Moreover, seven years as part of the German Reich had left Austria no contacts of her own with the outside world. While his Government was still in process of formation, Leopold Figl summed up its main tasks as ensuring the necessities of life for the people, creating a unified Austria, and restoring her relations with foreign countries, especially with her neighbours. As gradual progress was made in the solution of these problems, a fourth objective of increasing urgency emerged which held the two main parties together in joint endeavour: the signature of a State treaty that would bring an end to the occupation and re-establish Austria as a sovereign State.

Though these exacting tasks were sufficient to justify the existence of a coalition, there were other reasons for it which arose out of the nature and previous record of Austrian democracy.

The elections had shown that the two main political parties were closely matched in strength. The probable alternative to an alliance between them, therefore, would be tense political strife, which, in the circumstances of national emergency,

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665 would be suicidal. In 1950, after nearly five years' experience of the Coalition, Oskar Pollak, the Socialist editor of the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, a man of the strongest party convictions, wrote:—

> When a democratic country owing to the class division of its people . . . is split into two great camps, two parties of approximately equal strength, this country cannot be governed by democratic methods against the will of one of the two parties. . . . History has shown that every attempt to rule such a country through one half of the population against the wishes of the other must lead to the jeopardizing and even to the annihilation of democracy.

Pollak, of course, had in mind the history of his own country between the Wars.

665 642 Memories of the bitter political conflict and division between 1920 and 1938 had a powerful influence on the course of post-War politics. After the First World War the coalition experiment had lasted for only two years, and it was clear in retrospect that this had been a mistake and that the statesmen who had worked to renew collaboration had been on the right lines. A particularly sinister aspect of Austrian party cleavage was the geographical aspect that has already been mentioned, Vienna since 1918 having been predominantly Socialist and the provinces mostly Right Wing in sympathy. Giving free rein to political rivalry, therefore, would have involved accentuating the division between the provinces and the capital that was already a serious danger.

Finally, the Coalition solved, as far as was possible, the problem of maintaining good relations with Russia and the other occupying Powers. Russian disappointment with the election results went deep, but it was some compensation that the Communists were given not only a seat in the Cabinet but membership of the parliamentary Main Committee as well. Figl described his new Government diplomatically as a 'government of concentration', and this point was seized on as something of a forlorn hope by Ernst Fischer, who in an article in *Neues Österreich* on the 18th of December 1945 emphasized the difference between a mere parliamentary

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'coalition' and a 'concentration of democratic forces' that applied to every level and category in the life of the State.

As the Austrian Coalition has survived for so long, it is important to understand its nature. It differs considerably from coalitions to which other democratic countries are accustomed, and the difference results from the special characteristics of the Austrian party system and the Austrian form of democracy.

In France the numerous political parties are distinguished from one another in some cases by almost imperceptible shades of political opinion. In the United States the two great political parties could simultaneously hope to win Eisenhower as their leader; while in Britain moderate leaders from opposite sides, like Baldwin and MacDonald, Eden and Bevin, can follow each other with little noticeable break in continuity. But the record of the Austrian Republic has, on the whole, been very different, though the contrast is in process of modification. On the one side are the Socialists, with their radical idealism, their materialism, and their admiration for the Marxian analysis; on the other side, the Right Wing, with its Catholicism, its respect for tradition, and its varying forms of nostalgia for the past. They differ from each other not only in temperament and in their views on the speed and method of political advance but, in many cases, in their whole attitude towards life and its purpose and towards the nature of society and the State. This fundamental contrast in *Weltanschauung*, or philosophy of life, has been one of the main reasons for the stability of party loyalties in Austria through the years. People are much less likely to change their allegiance if religious conviction and deep-rooted social attitude are involved, than if the alteration merely concerns the method of approach to a broadly similar ideal.

The contrast is sustained, and tends to be increased, by the dominance and rigidity of the party organizations in Austrian politics. Voting is according to the system of proportional representation and the party list, the whole country being divided into no more than twenty-five electoral districts or

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constituencies. The elector does not vote for the man of his choice but for a list of candidates selected by the leaders of his party. There is therefore no personal contact between the member of parliament and his constituents, and even the politically minded citizen usually does not know the names of the members who represent him. Once in Parliament the member feels himself to be less a representative of the electorate than an official of his party, and the discipline of the party parliamentary club is strong. The club determines how he shall vote and sometimes how he shall speak. The opportunity for the individual to influence the democratic process outside the club is small, and the occasions are very rare when a parliamentary debate develops along lines unforeseen and unplanned by the party organizers.

The impersonal nature of the legislative procedure is increased by the rule requiring certain draft laws to be referred, before submission to Parliament, to Chambers representing sectional interests of the community, such as the Chamber of Agriculture and the Chamber of Workers and Employees, in which party interests are often strong. In the case of Bills wholeheartedly approved by the interests concerned, the subsequent parliamentary proceedings tend to lose in significance.

The large part played by the party machines in the whole process of government accentuates political antagonism. Individuals have a greater capacity for compromise than organizations, and under the Austrian system the scope given to the human element is reduced to a minimum.

This state of affairs contributed much to the intensity and bitterness of the political conflict between the Wars. The opposing parties, with their utterly different ideologies, were so taken up with the trial of strength between them that they mistook the means for the end. They forgot that the true purpose of the democratic process is to find something out and, having come as near as possible to discovering the best course, to act upon it. Such qualities as humour, good nature, friendliness, and a capacity to live and let live make Austrians natural democrats. Yet these very qualities were squeezed

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out of political life by the ruthless working of the party machines. With a measure of justice Christian Socialists accused Social Democrats of putting party before country; of obstructing legislation during their long period in opposition, and of seeking to establish something like a dictatorship of the proletariat. With as much justice the Socialists accused the Right-Wing parties of the arrogant assertion of power; of undermining the democratic system, and finally of dispensing with Parliament and establishing a form of government on the Fascist model.

Such a party system and such a background of party strife mean that a coalition government in Austria is a very different thing from a war-time coalition in Britain or a working group of political parties in France. The Austrians learned much from the pre-War tragedy and much from the Nazi ordeal. But political memories are retentive and party differences deep-rooted, and the recollection of the between-War period, though salutary as a warning, still hangs like a curse over Austrian political life. There are very few Austrians who can speak or write of the time with anything approaching objectivity. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Coalition has had its ups and downs. There have been occasions in its existence when it has seemed on the verge of collapse. Yet its very precariousness has increased its value to the country. If politicians have a tendency to fly at one another's throats, it is all the more important, in a time of national emergency, that they should be held together to serve the common cause.

The inherent tension in Austrian political life has affected the nature of the Coalition in one particular way. There has been a common acceptance of the principle of what is called *Proporz*; that is, the principle that the proportionate strength of the parties in Parliament should be reflected not only in the allocation of Cabinet seats but in the distribution of public offices in general. Each party claims a right to a share of representation in the policy-making governmental committees, the boards of directors of nationalized industries, and even in administrative and industrial appointments at a lower level. The system has

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642 665 its advantages in a coalition where party rivalry runs high. Occasions for friction are reduced to a minimum, because every party has its due share of influence. Ministers can surround themselves with officials of their own way of thinking in the knowledge that their colleagues belonging to other parties will do the same. On the other hand, in the long run the system has serious disadvantages as well. It is the mathematical *reductio ad absurdum* of the over-organized coalition. A great strain is placed on political sincerity when party membership is known to be the key to office. Political opinions come to be the main qualifications for appointments in which technical knowledge and experience should count for most. Above all, the party aspect of political life is continuously emphasized, when it is most important it should be played down, and an atmosphere of huckstering prevails in the appointment to offices where ability and devotion to the State service are the qualities most required.

Nevertheless, in spite of weaknesses, the Coalition has succeeded and survived. On the whole, it has been a healthy influence in Austrian political life. Its dangers have been less serious than unbridled political conflict. In 1945 eleven years of authoritarian government had created a gap in Austrian political experience. Some of the new leaders had had no parliamentary experience. Those who had were mostly old and nearing the end of their careers. The new generation of politicians, however, is accustomed to compromise and collaboration. It has grown up under a Chancellor and two Presidents who put party second to the State. It has been schooled by external pressure to appreciate the value of the heritage that all political parties share.

727 642 The Coalition, however, has never had full responsibility for the government of Austria. It has been subject continuously to the authority of the Allied Control Commission made up of the four occupying Powers.

The system of supervision established on the 20th of October 1945, when the Allied Council recognized the Provisional Government, lasted for just over eight months. It involved

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Probably the most important result was to make possible greater freedom of expression during Cabinet meetings.

The life of an Austrian Parliament is limited by the constitution to four years. Elections were therefore due to be held not later than November 1949 and actually took place on October the 9th 1949. There were two main differences between the political situation then and in 1945. First, the number of electors had increased by over 940,000. Of these more than 400,000 were 'less implicated' Nazis, to whom the franchise had been restored the previous summer, and the remainder were either returned soldiers or persons who had acquired Austrian citizenship since 1945. Secondly, a number of new parties had entered the scene. Of these only two, the Union of Independents and the Democratic Union, succeeded in polling more than 10,000 votes, but a new fluidity and vitality in political life were indicated by the fact that at one stage during the year over forty new parties had announced their existence.

In the elections 97 per cent of the qualified voters went to the polls, compared with 94 per cent in 1945. The People's Party increased its votes by 244,354, the Socialists by 188,626, and the Communists, reinforced with some extreme Left-Wing Socialists, by 35,809. The Union of Independents obtained 489,273 votes and the Democratic Union 12,059. As regards seats, the People's Party got 77, the Socialists 67, the Union of Independents 16, and the so-called Left Block 5.

The election was significant for two reasons. It justified the Coalition Government by showing that it substantially represented the people's view. At the same time it made clear that there were about half a million people who were dissatisfied with the programme of the two main parties and the Communists. They were likely to prove an important political force in the future.

On the 31st of December 1950, Dr. Renner died, only a few days after the celebration of his eightieth birthday. His greatest achievement for post-War Austria had been as Chancellor in the Provisional Government. But while Federal President during the next five years he had been a wise and stabilizing

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and a greater measure of independent support than was generally expected. 643

During the first campaign efforts were made with some success to keep the party aspect of the contest under control. But the second, through no fault of the two candidates, involved a good deal of party bitterness and personal animosity. Fortunately this lapse from the best post-War political standards was made good by the example of the new President and his chivalrous defeated rival. When the election result was announced, Gleissner at once telegraphed his congratulations and good wishes to Körner. President Körner himself responded soon after his election by visiting Linz, the capital of Upper Austria. At the official ceremony of welcome he announced that he had shown his personal esteem for Dr. Gleissner by addressing him with the familiar '*du*' as they drove together from the station. 666

After its success in the two general elections, the People's Party received a severe shock from its defeat in the presidential election, all the more so because its candidate was a strong one. As a result, a thorough re-organization of the party was carried out. Changes were made in the main party officials and in the party's representatives in the Government. 665

More significant for Austria as a whole was the increase in the independent vote. Without doubt many of those who had voted for the Union of Independents in 1949 and Dr. Breitner in 1950 were disgruntled ex-Nazis, whose opposition was mainly negative. The attitude to the Nazi problem of the Austrian Government and people in general was sensible, broad-minded, and Christian. Except in the worst cases they wanted as soon as possible to let bygones be bygones. They were unwilling to drive into implacable discontent the disillusioned and repentant party members who were ready to be converted in 1945 and had only become Nazis originally through a mixture of fear and economic necessity. Dr. Koref, Burgomaster of Linz, spoke for the great majority of Austrians in July 1946 when he said: 'We are all agreed that we should not use Nazi methods to bring about the last liquidation of

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665 National Socialism. . . . No one of good will should find his way back to the democratic community barricaded.' But under the vigilant eyes of the Allied Control Commission the Austrian Government was not able to carry out its denazification in its own way. The penalties of fine, disappropriation, and exclusion from office that were imposed were not always unduly severe, but they were applied in a mechanical, inflexible way that was perhaps inevitable, but caused hardship in individual cases, both to Nazis and to some of their original victims. This produced a hardened and embittered element in Austrian society. Reinforced by German-speaking refugees from Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe, some of whom acquired Austrian citizenship, it provided the hard core of the new opposition to Government policy.

On the other hand, it would be misleading to suggest that the opposition was mainly negative in its attitude or Nazi and refugee in its origin. The new parties contained men of patriotism, originality, sincerity, and courage. Their programmes were a stimulating influence. Even the numerically insignificant Democratic Union, with its forlorn belief in diplomatic neutrality, was directed by the fertile intellect of Professor Dobretsberger, an ex-Minister and distinguished economist. The Union of Independents included able and constructive thinkers as well as the negative and less desirable elements.

668 The most significant of the new political movements was the Youth Front, which was started by a group of young politicians sympathetic to the People's Party. It was impatient of the leadership and critical of the organization of the party, although affiliated to it. The result of the presidential election seemed to justify the Youth Front's criticisms, and its members became more outspoken. In the summer of 1951 it was repudiated by the party, and shortly afterwards came to an end.

Though the Youth Front's existence was brief it showed a phoenix-like persistence. In November 1951 its leaders joined with some of Dr. Breitner's supporters and other kindred spirits to form the 'Action for Political Renewal'. The following spring discussions started between the 'Action' and the

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more moderate and positive elements in the Union of Independents, which led to the formation of a common Working Committee and the decision to fight the next election with a joint programme.

This new opposition was impatient of the leadership of the two main parties. It was determined to provide an alternative programme that would rival Communism in the effectiveness of its appeal and at the same time reflect the Austrian dislike of a totalitarian society. It accused the older parties of living in the past and failing completely to win the devotion of youth. It attacked corruption, bureaucracy, political indifference, and the place-seeking of the *Proporz* régime. It favoured free enterprise, a more personal system of political representation, and a dynamic society free from privilege of birth and property. Whether its claims to provide something better than existing creeds are justified, time and its own political record will show. It was, at any rate, a healthy sign that the different groups should come together in a common constructive effort and that the purely negative elements should lose weight.

In the autumn of 1952 a serious difference of opinion arose on economic policy between the People's Party and the Socialists, and on the 23rd of October the Government resigned. At President Körner's request it consented to remain in office until the following February, when it was agreed elections should be held.

In these elections the Socialists gained 6 seats, 3 from the People's Party, 2 from the Right-Wing independents, and 1 from the Communists. Though they had 73 seats to the People's Party's 74, they actually obtained 36,842 more votes. The serious increase in unemployment during the winter contributed to this result, as one of the main points in the Socialist programme was the maintenance of employment. The elections were a setback for the opposition. The Union of Independents, who had fought the campaign with the Action for Political Renewal, polled some 16,000 less votes than in 1949. The Democratic Union lost its identity and many of its

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665 more moderate adherents by merging with the Communists to form the 'People's Opposition'.

666 It was rightly held in Austria and abroad that the elections were a triumph for the forces making for stability and moderation and that the Austrian people had again expressed their confidence in the Coalition. The Federal President called on the People's Party to nominate their candidate for the Chancellorship, and Dr. Figl was asked to form another coalition government.

665 So far from solving the crisis, however, the result at first intensified the deadlock. The Socialists claimed that the electorate had pronounced in favour of their policy and demanded increased representation in the Government. The People's Party maintained that it had yielded too much influence to the Socialists in the past and that, as the parties of the Right had obtained 200,000 more votes than those of the Left, the Socialist claim was unreasonable. The party declared itself in favour of a three-party coalition, including the Union of Independents. To emphasize the parliamentary strength of its position it published a working programme that it had agreed to jointly with the Union of Independents.

642 Following weeks of hard bargaining Dr. Figl gave up his attempt to form a government just one month after the elections. The People's Party Executive unanimously chose their chairman, Julius Raab, as his successor. On the 1st of April, Raab succeeded in forming a coalition government consisting of the Socialists and People's Party only. In it the Socialists obtained two junior Ministries in addition to their previous representation. The new Coalition was based on a two-party understanding less comprehensive than in the previous post-War Governments. For example, the party truce did not extend to the provinces and the municipalities. It was significant that a provisional compromise budget that had been agreed on in the autumn of 1952 was extended to the end of the year.

During the course of the negotiations President Körner in a public speech made a surprising statement in which he implied

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of the Economics Division of the American High Commissioner's Office. This document, which was entitled 'The Restraint of Competition in the Austrian Economy', strongly criticized the various forms of restraint, such as cartels, political associations, and organized group interests, and recommended the education of public opinion on the merits of a competitive régime.

On the other hand, the Socialist Party, while accepting the need for economy and self-help, was opposed to any reduction in social services; preferred government, to private, investment; was more conscious of the evils than of the merits of competition, and stressed the dangers of unemployment rather than the dangers of renewed inflation.

In November 1951 Dr. Franz Nemschak, Director of the Austrian Institute for Economic Research, emphasized the significance of Austria's economic problems for the country as a whole, and recommended that in working out a solution the Government should take the advice of experts rather than allow themselves to be influenced by sectional interests. He deplored particularly the tendency for economic policy to be determined by considerations of party politics.

Dr. Nemschak's warnings and recommendation were justified. By giving full consideration to the views of independent experts, it might well have been possible to agree on an economic policy for the country. As has been seen, there was common acceptance of some of the main objectives, and on the controversial points a degree of compromise was possible. To aspire after the ideal expert solution, however, is a tendency characteristic of democracies and one that is almost invariably disappointed. The circumstances in which party considerations finally confused the issue were not free from an element of accident.

Members of the People's Party held the three key Ministries of Finance, Trade, and Agriculture. The second instalment of the Party's reorganization, following its defeat in the presidential election, took the form of replacing the three Ministers in question in January 1952. Dr. Kamitz, the new Finance

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Minister, was a financial and economic expert who believed that the budget could only be balanced satisfactorily by stringent economy in national expenditure. The new Minister of Trade, Herr Böck-Greisau, was an experienced industrialist, with a special interest in export problems, who believed in free enterprise, and shared Dr. Kamitz' view on the need for economy. Both men were convinced exponents of the new policy of self-reliance and self-help.

Before the end of 1951 the Coalition Government's efforts to establish financial stability had already met with success. To restrict credit expansion the bank-rate was raised from 3½ to 5 per cent on December the 6th, while the trade unions and the employers collaborated to keep prices down. During the first four months of 1952 savings-bank deposits rose by 538 million schillings, compared with an increase of only 77 million schillings during the whole of 1951.

One reason why the People's Party appointed the new Ministers was that it wished to strengthen its representation in the Cabinet. But it believed also that their policy was what Austria needed at the time. A natural result of its action, however, was that the policy tended to become a party issue, although it had virtually been started before the Cabinet changes took place.

The new Ministers were energetic and uncompromising in carrying out the measures in which they believed. Within a few months of his taking office Herr Böck-Greisau was with difficulty dissuaded from relinquishing his post on a question of principle. During the autumn party differences came to a head over Dr. Kamitz' proposals for an economy budget. The People's Party was mainly interested in a deflationary policy to maintain the value of the schilling. The Socialists wanted bigger expenditure on public works and new housing projects in order to keep up employment. No agreement could be reached, and so, as has been seen, the Government resigned. Pending the elections a temporary compromise budget was accepted by both sides.

Before the elections took place the new economic policy

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had achieved considerable success. The currency had been stabilized. Between December 1951 and December 1952 wholesale prices had dropped 6·4 per cent and the cost of living 1 per cent. With unimportant exceptions wages had remained constant. Total savings during 1952 amounted to over a billion schillings, compared to the 77 million in 1951. Although the gross national product only just kept up to the level for the previous year, the foreign trade position improved substantially. Figures available in February 1953 showed a drop in the balance-of-trade deficit from 4·3 billion schillings in 1951 to 3·1 billion in 1952, while the balance-of-payments deficit fell from $176 million to $100 million.

The Ministers of Trade and Finance deserved great credit for this achievement. But it must be remembered that they were members of a coalition government and that the policy of stabilization had begun before their appointment. Furthermore, the policy depended for its success on the voluntary action of both industrialists and trade unions in keeping down prices and wages.

During the election campaign a large measure of agreement on economic and financial policy was revealed between the Socialists and the People's Party, but the gap between the two points of view, which had made elections necessary, could not be closed entirely. The serious deterioration in the employment situation accentuated the differences on this vital issue. At the end of 1952 there were nearly 100,000 more unemployed than there had been in December 1951, and throughout 1952 the average number of unemployed had been 158,000, compared with 117,000 the previous year.

The deadlock that followed the elections and delayed the formation of a new Government for more than five weeks was proof of the stubbornness of the differences. The replacement of Figl by the industrialist Raab made it clear that a long-term compromise could not be expected: the Coalition survived, but for external, not for internal reasons. It was, nevertheless, encouraging that Austria's two main political parties should have

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revealed such strong convictions about the country's economic future. The contrast between this attitude and the listless indifference that was common in the immediate post-War years was one practical indication of the achievement of Marshall Aid.

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assistants. Subsequently the situation improved, as an increasing number of returned prisoners of war became available and some relaxation was allowed in the law excluding all former National Socialists from teaching.

The shortage of food was so general that the educational authorities were not in a position to make special arrangements for school-children, but, as has been seen, much was done for them by Swedish, Danish, and Swiss voluntary relief organizations. During the winters that immediately followed the War it was only possible to heat a proportion of the schools, the 'winter schools', as they came to be called; and then the already large classes doubled up or the shift system was intensified. The acute fuel shortage at the beginning of 1947 led to so-called 'coal holidays'.

The Allied cultural and educational organizations played an important part in breaking down the intellectual isolation from which the teachers had suffered so long and of which the best of them were acutely conscious. The French and British ran summer schools for teachers in Austria each year, which were also attended by teachers from France and England; and visits for Austrian teachers were arranged to England, France, Switzerland, and the United States. A limited number of Austrian school-children were also enabled to travel abroad. With the active co-operation of foreign countries, the Austrian Ministry of Education revived some of the schemes for exchanging teachers which had been in operation before the *Anschluss*.

Education is one of the subjects on which there are strongly felt differences between the People's Party and the Socialists. Since the War the differences have been accentuated by the fact that for more than five years Dr. Hurdes, the Minister of Education, was also General Secretary of the People's Party, and by the fact that the Vienna School Board was under Socialist control. The main subjects of difference are religious instruction, private schools, and the best method by which a ninth year could be added to the period of compulsory schooling. There is agreement on the principle of extending the

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period of schooling, but party conflict prevents the necessary law being passed.

In spite of this impasse, a great deal has been accomplished in Austrian schools since the War under most difficult conditions. Both parties have been agreed on the validity of three guiding principles which were to be emphasized in the new educational era, according to a directive issued in September 1945: Austrian patriotism (*Volks- und Staatsbewußtsein*), democracy, and humanity. Their experiences between 1938 and 1945 have brought home to Austrians the value of the first two principles more clearly than ever before. The third is deeply embedded in the Austrian nature and tradition.

Austria's three universities and her other institutions of higher learning suffered some material damage during the War, especially the University of Vienna and the Technical Institutes at Vienna and Graz. Their work after the War was also severely hampered by the shortage of fuel and food. But the most serious problems that faced them were lack of staff and lack of money.

Some of Austria's finest scholars had gone into exile during the German occupation. Of those that remained many of the younger had been called up for military service, and a number of the ablest and most influential were excluded from teaching as incriminated Nazis. Germans, who had been appointed to Austrian universities under Hitler, returned to Germany. Some of the gaps could be filled by bringing back professors who had been forced into retirement by the Nazis and had remained in Austria. But there were still many vacancies for which it was very difficult to find the right men. The younger generation of university teachers had suffered severely from the War, and it was rarely possible to persuade Austrian exiles, who had settled down happily in other countries, to return to Austria under the prevailing economic and political conditions and at the low salaries that were offered. For more than two years after the War, Vienna University was even unable to fill its chair of English.

Lack of funds not only kept down salary scales; it made it

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XIII

The Communist Challenge

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AFTER their defeat in the elections of 1949 the Austrian Communists could have little hope for their future as a parliamentary opposition. But in neighbouring Soviet satellite States Communist minorities had obtained power by force, misrepresentation, and ingenuity. Such methods had possibilities for the Austrian Communists themselves. An opportunity for experimenting with them was not long in presenting itself.

In the summer of 1950 there was much discontent in Austria. The Third Price–Wage Agreement had imposed all-round sacrifices but failed to stop inflation. The cost of living was rising again, and was bound to rise still further. On the 22nd of September, after weeks of severe bargaining, the Fourth Price–Wage Agreement was approved by the Government, the trade unions, and representatives of industry and agriculture. It was a compromise that none of the negotiators liked. The people as a whole had lost faith in such agreements.

The Communists chose this time to try out their new methods and challenge the Government's authority. Two weeks of crisis and disorder were the result. The immediate aim was a general strike. The pattern of activity was everywhere very much the same. The terms of the new Agreement were grossly misrepresented, and workers were called upon to strike in protest. Force was used to undermine trade union authority and disorganize public services. Railways, roads, and tram-lines were blocked. Rumours were put about of sympathetic forces in reserve. Czech troops were said to be ready at the frontier. The Communist Party's slogan, 'It is only 60 kilometres to the People's Democracies', acquired a new and sinister meaning.

In Vienna the main disturbances occurred on the 26th of

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September, backed by unscrupulous propaganda through the radio and the Press. Tram services were obstructed, and some of the main railway lines to the provinces were temporarily blocked. Flying squads made raids on gas works, power-stations, and other vital points. The trouble culminated when thousands of strikers from USIA factories, having been taken to the centre of the city by lorry and bus, assembled with others in a crowd 6,000 strong before the Federal Chancellery in the Ballhausplatz. They listened to speeches by Ernst Fischer, Franz Honner, and other Communist leaders, and demanded that the Chancellor should receive a deputation immediately. Dr. Figl, who had remained in his office, refused to grant an interview under pressure, but agreed to see the deputation the following day. Soon afterwards the crowd began to disperse. In the course of the day there were some unpleasant episodes between the Communists and the police, and the task of the police was made much more difficult by the fact that the Soviet authorities refused to allow reinforcements to be moved from Russian districts to other parts of the city.

On the morning of the 27th the Chancellor, in the presence of the Vice-Chancellor, received the demonstrators' deputation and promised to refer their grievances to the Cabinet and the Trade Union Federation. But after the 26th the most critical moment was past. The trade unions had had time to counter with sober facts the wild rumours regarding the terms of the new agreement. When the Viennese workers had an opportunity to consider the real issue, the great majority of them remained loyal to their chosen leaders and rejected the Communist bait.

In the provinces, apart from isolated cases in Salzburg, the main trouble occurred in Upper Austria, Lower Austria, and Styria. The chief industrial centres in Lower Austria and Styria were in varying degrees affected. In Graz a number of Communist leaders smuggled themselves into trade union headquarters and tried to organize strikes by telephone in the name of the provincial trade union authorities, until this typical piece of deception was brought to an end by the police.

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665 668 In Upper Austria the position was aggravated by the presence of a high proportion of discontented refugees and displaced persons amongst the industrial workers and by the strength of the Union of Independents in some of the Works Councils. One of the biggest and longest strikes took place in the Steyr works of the Steyr-Daimler-Puch Company. In the Works Council of VÖEST, fourteen out of twenty-eight members belonged to the Union of Independents and two more were Communists, while additional agitators were sent there at the critical moment from Vienna and Lower Austria. As a result, Linz was one of the worst trouble centres in the whole of Austria.

On the 26th of September the workers of VÖEST and five other Linz concerns, together with the tram-drivers and conductors, went out on strike. About 15,000 demonstrators assembled on the main square, and some penetrated to the Mayor's office in the Town Hall. Officials of the Communist Party and Union of Independents then made speeches from the Town Hall balcony. The next day 1,000 strikers assembled before the Chamber of Workers' building, and some forced their way inside. They seized the seventy-six-year-old President of the Chamber, pushed him on to the balcony, and forced him to resign by threatening to throw him into the street.

For a day or two the situation was really dangerous. At Linz the Danube is the boundary between the American and Russian zones, and it was clear that the proceedings were being organized from the Russian side of the river. Firm action by a joint committee of the city and provincial authorities led to order being restored. Police reinforcements were brought in from the country, and the workers' elected leaders reasserted their authority. Within a week the strikers had all returned to work. Even the Union of Independents, which had been partly responsible for the trouble, sent a representative to the joint committee's meetings.

Between the 26th and 30th of September about 120,000 workers went on strike, including 40,000 employed by USIA,

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who had little freedom of choice. This was only about 8 per cent of the total number of industrial workers. But, in spite of the failure of their first offensive, the Communists made open preparations to renew the attack. On the evening of the 27th of September, when most of the strikes had already petered out, the order was given to the workers by radio to return to work the following day but await the decisions reached by the All-Austrian Shop Stewards' Conference, which was to meet on the 30th of September.

This Conference was a purely Communist idea, and duly met in Florisdorf, a suburb of Vienna in the Russian zone. Its purpose was to give to future Communist action an appearance of approval by workers' representatives on a national scale. But it in no way represented the workers as a whole, and the Trade Union Federation called upon its members not to attend. Most of those who appeared at Florisdorf chose themselves and were adherents of the Communist Party or League of Independents, some of them shop stewards and some of them not. The conference declared that unless the Government dropped the new Price–Wage Agreement by the 3rd of October a general strike would begin on the 4th. Some seductive but quite impracticable proposals were put forward as an alternative to the Agreement.

The Government and the trade unions took their own measures to prepare for the future and settle the past. The Trade Union Federation and the Socialist Party, in announcements to their members, dissociated themselves from the Communist action and made clear that the Communist statements about the Price–Wage Agreement were deliberately untrue: the real issues at stake were democracy and freedom. The Government suspended members of the police force who had failed in their duty, threatened to expel from the country any *Volksdeutsche* who assisted the trouble-makers, and called on the police to maintain order and stand firm against threats. A call to the Austrian people issued by the Government on the morning of the 3rd of October contained the following passage:

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668 'Defend the freedom of the country. Do not allow yourself to be intimidated by acts of violence. The power of the State is sufficient to check terrorist action at the start, so no one should yield to Communist pressure.'

727 668 In the Allied Council on the 29th of September the United States High Commissioner, who was in the chair, accused the Soviet element of having contributed to the recent disorders and lawlessness by encouragement and aid. He charged the Russians, amongst other things, with the following specific acts, violating quadripartite agreements: transporting rioters about Vienna in Soviet Army vehicles; blocking a railway line by means of a Soviet tank; interfering with the maintenance of law and order by stopping the movement of police, and preventing the police from checking rioters at St. Pölten railway station through the intervention of a Soviet official. The British and French representatives supported the American charges. The Soviet Deputy High Commissioner, in rejecting them, made the curious but typical statement that the unrest had been due to the indignation and bad living conditions of the Austrian workers resulting from the Marshall Plan.

665 668 Before the 4th of October it was already clear to the trade union leaders that an overwhelming majority of workers was opposed to a general strike. The Socialist Party had called conferences of Socialist shop stewards in all parts of the country, and their opinion on the subject was almost unanimous. Outside Vienna and the Russian zone the only strikes that occurred were at Hallein in Salzburg, and at the Steyr works in Upper Austria, where the workers had been out since the 26th of September. In Vienna itself there was scarcely a single strike of importance outside the USIA organization, though the news that thirty censors had stopped work at one of the post-offices caused some unexpected satisfaction. This did not prevent the Communist Strike Committee from announcing publicly that the strike in Vienna was practically complete. More serious were the organized attempts at blocking tramways and railway lines and erecting barricades and traffic obstacles in the streets. These were only mastered

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because the great mass of the people were on the side of law and order and turned against the Communist gangs that were trying to cause trouble. On the evening of the 4th of October Burgomaster Körner called on the Russian Military Commander and complained of what was happening. The commander replied that he was against interference in Austrian internal affairs on principle and opposed to the use of force by either side.

The worst trouble occurred in the Russian zone. Even here the number of strikers was comparatively small. In fact the total for the whole of Austria on the 4th and 5th of October was about 35,000, in addition to 40,000 USIA workers, not all of whom went on strike. But in the industrial centres of Lower Austria terrorist methods were employed. The Soviet authorities interfered with the police; railway lines were blocked; public services were threatened, and gangs of Communists used force and intimidation to compel workers to strike.

The most serious events occurred in Wiener Neustadt. There the terrorist methods against industries had only a limited measure of success, some of the workers, especially in the radiator factory, showing great spirit under attack. But the situation became critical when the Communists seized the post-office and telephone exchange. The city is in the heart of the Russian zone, only twelve miles from Soviet Military Headquarters, and the local police were not strong enough to restore order on their own. After understandable hesitation, the Minister of the Interior made the bold decision to send reinforcements from Vienna, and with this strengthening the police restored order and regained control of the post-office. The local Russian commander then intervened, ordering the restoration of the *status quo* within ten minutes and the withdrawal of the reinforcements. The position was finally righted by the general course of events.

Apart from Wiener Neustadt the Communist action throughout Austria had collapsed by the evening of October the 5th. The Florisdorf Conference decided that the strike

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665 should come to an end on the 6th, but its decision had been
668 anticipated by the Austrian workers.

668 With commendable speed and determination in defence of
its rights, the Government sent a note to the Allied Council
727 on the 5th of October, complaining of the Russian action in Wiener Neustadt. On the same day the Foreign Minister despatched a telegram in a similar sense to the Foreign Ministers of the four occupying Powers. The three Western Allies replied with notes in which they expressed their sympathy with the Austrian Government's point of view and their approval of the measures it had taken. They later made official protests to the Government of the Soviet Union.

668 The Government also issued a proclamation in which it thanked the Austrian people for defending their country by their courageous attitude and for proving to the world that Austria would never become a 'People's Democracy'. On the 6th of October a demonstration took place in Wiener Neustadt, where 20,000 people celebrated the victory over Communism and were addressed by the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice, who travelled down from Vienna especially for the purpose. The following day Burgomaster Körner and President Böhm of the Trade Union Federation attended another large victory demonstration before the Vienna Town Hall.

727 There are two questions that arise in connexion with the
whole series of disturbances. What was the Communists'
668 real intention? And how far did they receive Russian support?
665 The answer to the second question throws light on the problem raised by the first.

There is no doubt that the accusations of the United States High Commissioner against the Soviet Element were justified. At the same time there was some truth in the reply of the Russian Military Commander in Vienna to the Burgomaster's protest. That is to say, the Soviet authorities wanted to ensure that the Communists had full scope for their activities, and were prepared to take limited measures in their support, such as making vehicles available and preventing movements of the

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police. But they did not intend to give active aid to the demonstrators, and it is likely that such instances of it as occurred were due to the over-enthusiasm of individuals. Many people were injured in the disturbances and two men died of shock. Yet there was not a single case of violent death throughout the whole period of crisis. Such a result would have been inconceivable had the Soviet forces been active in support.

It is probable, therefore, that the Communist intention was to exploit popular dissatisfaction in order to bring about a general strike and, by so doing, to get control of the trade union movement. Had this intention been fulfilled, some modification in the Government might have followed, and the way would have been prepared for a further advance. The ultimate aim of the Communists, in which they could count on Russian support, was to turn Austria into a 'People's Democracy'. The 1950 action was a preliminary trial of strength.

The fundamental reason for the Communist failure was the Austrian people's attitude. But effective leadership and organization also played a vital part. Dr. Figl and Herr Helmer, the Minister of the Interior, were at their best at such a time. The Government acted with energy, courage, and persistence. The police, as a whole, were efficient, good-tempered, and loyal. The employees of the threatened public services were disciplined and reliable. Most important of all, the trade union leaders were unwavering in their attitude, and the great mass of the workers responded to their call. It was a fine proof of statesmanlike maturity that, in face of the Communist threat, the trade union movement stood staunchly by the Price–Wage compromise that none of its members really liked.

The Communist challenge had two important results. In spite of its failure, there had been a real trial of strength between two rival ideologies. The Communists had in their favour the initiative, the choice of time, and uncertainty regarding the extent of Soviet support. The victory of the Government and

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the trade unions increased the authority and confidence of both. In self-defence they took measures on which they had never ventured before, and their success strengthened their courage and resolution for the future.

Even more significant was the revelation of Communist aims and methods. The Austrian people were given a full-scale demonstration of tactics about which most of them had previously only read. The difference between Russian and Western conceptions of democracy and freedom was made clear beyond any doubt. If a small minority could cause so much trouble by employing the Communist technique, for the sake of Austria's freedom and independence it was imperative that the minority should not be allowed to grow. Since the excesses of the Russian troops immediately after the War nothing within Austria has done more than the events of September and October 1950 to bring Austria closer to the West.



Clemens Holzmeister: Austrian Broadcasting House.

The end of the First World War and the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had similar paralysing results for Vienna as did the end of the Second World War, when there was not only a collapse of the existing regime, but in addition extensive war damage to be faced. The general reorganisation of the State which took place after 1918 proved less difficult, not only because there had been no actual war damage in Vienna itself, but also because the forces released by the conclusion of the war were not hindered in their development by the pressure of an occupation. Nevertheless, it was years before the Austrian economy and the capital city had so far recovered that it was possible to go beyond efforts to satisfy the daily needs of the population and start constructive municipal schemes.

The political revolution of November 1918 secured the full triumph of democratic principles. Universal, equal and direct suffrage, with a secret ballot, was extended to women and, for the first time, applied to the election of members of a Vienna city council. As a result the influence of the masses of citizens which had until then been artifically suppressed now took full effect on the composition of the Council Chamber. Power in the municipal assembly consequently went to the Party of the workers, the Social-Democrats. By securing the majority in the City Council the latter found themselves in a position to put their principles into practice in various fields of municipal activity. During the 15 years after the First World War that the Social-Democrats were able to run the municipal affairs of Vienna, entirely new principles were applied to the administration of public welfare, housing, the conduct of public utility services, the educational system and to questions of personnel. As the basis and support of all these innovations a new financial policy was devised and put into practice. The successful achievements of this exceptionally fruitful period of Vienna municipal administration—it must be remembered that they were not carried out during a period of general prosperity and easy-living,

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ings of Pope Leo XIII's encyclicals. Now, in the dark postwar misery, he took an active part in Students' Help, organized by Professor of Theology Innitzer, now Cardinal Archbishop. They provided free meals and distributed clothes. Those "terrible years," as he calls them, have impregnated the conservative background of his home with a strong social consciousness. Even later, when he emerged as a leading economist, he never lost his early understanding of the struggle of the small people.

After graduating as Engineer (*Ing.* is an academic title in Germanic countries, used like our *Dr.*) Ing. Raab went into the family business. At the same time, he turned to politics, a field that interested him from early youth: his mother's brother was a distinguished member of the imperial Reichstag. In 1927, his home town elected him as their Christian Social deputy to Parliament. "For the first year," he recalls, "I sat back and listened, to learn the ropes." He had an unbounded admiration for the chancellor, Monsignor Ignaz Seipel, "the greatest statesman Austria ever had."

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Austrian politics became so bitter in those years that every big party had a military organization. Once the Socialists armed themselves, Prince Starhemberg founded the anti-Socialist *Heimwehr*. Raab joined it at the instigation of Seipel, who wanted him to work inside

[665] 643 the Heimwehr against Starhemberg's fascist tendencies. Inevitably, Raab and Starhemberg fell out. Raab left the *Heimwehr*. The communists call Raab a fascist, but that is stupid.

After Parliament was dispensed with under the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime, Raab won high repute as founder, organizer, and leader of the *Gewerbebund*, a nation-wide organization of all the trades, crafts, and industries. When Chancellor Schuschnigg made his last desperate attempt to stave off Hitler, he rallied the biggest names in the land around him. He made Raab minister of trade and transport.

After Hitler annexed his native Austria to the *Reich*, Raab was, of course, out in the wilderness. He was never personally persecuted, but he could not risk the family fortune by rejoining their old firm, and he started out on his own, in Vienna. So deep was nazi hatred towards Raab that at the outbreak of the 2nd World War he was formally declared unworthy of wearing a German uniform!

727 642 645 The Russians entered Vienna in the spring of 1945. Marshal Tolbukhin ordered a provisional government in which the Catholics, Socialists, and communists had to share every ministry. Builder Raab became secretary of state in the ministry for reconstruction, but was vetoed by the Russians as a minister in Figl's cabinet.

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643 441 Once more Raab turned his talents to economic fields. He created the Austrian *Wirtschaftsbund,* which reorganized Austrian economy and constituted a federal Chamber of Commerce, of which Raab was first president.

643 665 Raab was one of the founders of the *Oesterreichische Volkspartei,* the (Catholic) Austrian People's party, a deputy since 1948 and its "strong man" from the start. His political position was consolidated when the People's party elected him as their *Parteiobmann,* or leader, in 1951.

In the 1953 general elections, the OVP did not do so well as the Socialists. The party decided that a change of prime minister was needed. A new one, it thought, would more likely get maximum concessions from the Socialists in the coalition government. As things stood, with Catholic and Socialist seats nearly balanced, the OVP could have got a majority with the aid of the small Independent party. But realist Raab holds that in the present difficult international situation, only a strong government of the two biggest parties can achieve that primordial aim, restoration of full Austrian sovereignty.

643 While I was with the chancellor, the clock in his room played a gay carillon to strike the full hour. It did not disturb him. He admitted placidly that he has no ear for music. He never goes to opera or theater, those two glories of Vienna.

9: Rothschild E-4, 5 (no date) 1947 EK1 Austria EK1

production was in a chaotic state and could not absorb the men who came back from the army and from the munition industries. Unemployment, which had been at a level of about 46,000 in December, 1918, rose quickly to a peak of 186,000 (131,500 in Vienna) in May, 1919, at the very time when the Western democracies enjoyed a short-lived post-war boom. After that, unemployment decreased steadily until it reached its lowest level in November, 1921, when there were 8,709 unemployed on the register.

THE INFLATION

The extent of Austria's economic exhaustion after the last war has been deliberately described at some length so as to indicate the level from which reconstruction had to start. No doubt, it was a tremendous job. But, with the relief credits to help out in the first period of distress, it was surely not beyond the strength of the Austrian people to build up a working economy. The tens of thousands of workers who struck work in January, 1918, in order to finish the war, the soldiers who returned disgusted with the war and the old régime, the peasants who had more than enough of the constant military requisitioning, all combined to turn out the Emperor, practically without any bloodshed; and they now looked confidently to the new Republic to lay the foundations for a new life.

There was much enthusiasm here that could have been harnessed to a great crusade for the rebuilding of the nation's life. But it was the tragedy of the situation that the statesmen of the day, those of the right and those of the left alike, completely lacked the required conception of leadership. Instead of stimulating the patriotic and social aspirations of the masses and guiding them in the difficult tasks of reconstruction, the general attitude of the leading politicians, reared in a 50-million empire, was to profess

[Cf. CAT. 116, p. 34 — ANALYST]

AUSTRIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

complete disbelief in Austria's ability to exist as an independent entity. The mistaken policy towards the national minorities in the past decades (mistakes that were shared by the German-speaking politicians of the right and the left alike) ruled out any close union with the Slav neighbours. The incorporation of Austria into Germany was therefore advocated as the only practicable solution.

"Our task was", wrote Dr. Otto Bauer, the leading figure in the Social Democratic Party and the Foreign Minister of the 1919 coalition government, "to convince the statesmen of the Entente that German Austria, if left to herself, was not capable of existence; that any attempt to form a confederation of the Succession States must be baffled by the opposition of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; that union with Germany was therefore the only possible solution, and the only means of averting the complete economic collapse of German Austria and the violent social disorders and grave dangers of war which must ensue."

But the idea was not really popular.

"At the same time we had to carry on propaganda among our own people. If our appeal to the statesmen of the Entente was not to remain barren we must be able to show them that our struggle for union was based on the united conviction of the whole German Austrian people."[1]

Propaganda of this kind was obviously not designed to rouse the spirits and unleash the energies of an exhausted population. A strong and democratic patriotism, which enabled the neighbouring Czechoslovakia—though admittedly under more favourable conditions—to re-establish her economic life with very little outside help, could hardly flourish in such an atmosphere of defeatism. How could one give allegiance to a country that could not possibly exist? There was much local patriotism—for

1 [CP. CAT. 116, P 34 — ANALYST]

THE BIRTH OF A NEW REPUBLIC

Vienna, for Tyrol, for Salzburg, for instance; but the cohesive force of a national conception was largely missing. Moreover, the provinces feared that an unproductive Vienna would hang like a deadweight on their economy and some of the western provinces tried to break away and to join Germany or Switzerland. In addition, the small but active Pan-German minority [5] tried to use the defeatism of the major political parties to further their own imperialist aims of a Greater Germany.

Perhaps inflation was unavoidable by the time the war ended. After all, inflations swept practically all central and eastern Europe. But the course of inflation in Austria was greatly influenced by the weakness of a government which did not believe in its own and its people's strength. This is clearly shown by the speech made by the Christian Socialist Chancellor Seipel before the Council of the League of Nations in 1922, when he tried to obtain financial help for Austria. The collapse of Austria, he said, would be "a serious blow to the Treaties of Peace, for it would afford a proof that the new Austria which they created is incapable of existence, either now or in the future". [6]

What, then, was the main sequence of the economic events of the period of inflation, and what was its significance for the further development of Austria's economy? [7]

The roots of the post-war inflation went back to the war years. The strong inflationary pressure inherited from the past would have been difficult to restrain whatever the post-war setting. Taking July, 1914, as 1, the circulation of banknotes in the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy had risen to 13·17 in November, 1918, and the cost-of-living [8] to 16·40 in the same month.

The financial situation did not ease with the ending of hostilities. The delay in the arrival of relief supplies and

[C² CAT 116 p. 34 - - ANALYST]